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country needs

YOU?

How would the British Army of tomorrow
scale up to win a war of national interest?

⁶ WARFIGHTING AT SCALE:
REGENERATING AND
RECONSTITUTING MASS

Warfighting at scale: Regenerating and reconstituting mass

Driven, at least in part, by an imperative to deter resurgent state-based threats to the United Kingdom, the Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015 (SDSR15) set the British Army on a path towards restoring its readiness to fight wars ‘at scale’ and specifically to regenerate a division at readiness by 2025.

This prompted CHACR to embark upon a new line of inquiry, starting with perceived threats and working forwards to the operational realisation of deterrence in practice. The insights from this line of enquiry led us naturally to consider how the British Army could ready itself for the ‘war it might have to fight’. This task fell naturally into two parts: the planned regeneration of divisional-level capability as directed by SDSR15; and the possible need to go further by establishing a plan for reconstituting mass (or mitigating for its absence). Thus a workshop was assigned to each of these subjects, conducted respectively on 23 June and 29 July.

This single edition of *Ares & Athena* brings together a collection of insights from these events and reflections from its participants (military and civilian; serving and retired). As ever, the authors of these inputs are both varied and unspecified. **We emphasise that their views in no way represent an official view either from the MOD, British Army or any part thereof.** However, they are a evidence of an Army that is determined to work, in collaboration with others, to confront the challenges it may face. CHACR exists to provide a hub for intellectual engagement with such issues as an essential precursor to understanding them.

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The views expressed in this publication are those of contributing individuals and in no way represent the official views of the British Army, Ministry of Defence or any components thereof.



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THE DIVISION – AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

For an army that wishes to be taken seriously, the division provides the basic building block of deployable capability. Only at the divisional level can the full orchestra of ‘all arms’ be combined or integrated to best effect, and the next battle or engagement be planned when the current one is underway. The division, which should be self-sustaining with a sufficient ‘slice’ of Force Support troops and other ‘enablers’, represents the minimum credible contribution to a coalition or alliance operation for anything other than an enduring peacekeeping operation. A well-trained, quickly deployed warfighting division provides reassurance to friends and allies, and contributes to the robust deterrence of our opponents. Thus regenerating the warfighting division within the context of multinational corps operations represents one of the most important tasks facing the British Army today.

Although the number of divisions a nation can raise and deploy does not necessarily reflect an army’s overall capability, there is nonetheless a quality in numbers. As can be seen from the table opposite, the British Army fielded the greatest number of divisions in its history during the First World War. Scale matters with regard to friends and foes alike. During the 1944-45 campaign in north-western Europe, Montgomery’s Twenty-First Army Group contained only two field armies in comparison to Haig’s five during 1916-1918. Montgomery was typically an army – six to 12 divisions – short throughout the campaign. Without owning a sufficient proportion of the forces in a coalition or alliance, it is hard to influence the decisions made as to their employment during a campaign – an enduring lesson from recent conflicts as well as earlier ones.

Historically, the division has its origins in the mid-18th century. Like the later ‘army corps’ introduced in 1799, it was a French innovation. The introduction of self-contained divisions and corps allowed armies to make the best use of limited roads and foraging possibilities in Europe, and then to fight united on the battlefield. The British Army first fielded numbered divisions during the Napoleonic Wars (*pictured*), and again during the Crimean War. In contrast to their Continental counterparts, however, these were ad-hoc formations that did not exist in peacetime. The French, Prussian/German and Russian Armies of the 19th century all developed similar systems of standing – territorially based – army corps that consisted of a number (usually two-to-three)

The number of divisions in the British Army		
Date	War	Type and number
1800s	Peninsula	5-10 (including Portuguese)
1853-1856	Crimea	5-6 Infantry; 1 Cavalry
1899-1902	Boer	11
August 1914	Opening of the First World War	6 Infantry; 1 Cavalry (Regular); 14 Territorial
1914-1918	Course of the First World War	90 raised (66 employed on the Western Front)
Sept 1939	Opening of the Second World War	7 Regular; 21 Territorial
1939-1945	Course of the Second World War	46 raised
1970s-1980s		4-5 Infantry; 3-4 in BAOR

divisions, often two infantry and one cavalry. Each infantry division comprised typically two brigades, each with two regiments, which in turn had three-to-four battalions apiece.

While the British adopted the levels of command division and brigade, the term ‘regiment’ meant, and remains, something completely different: for the infantry, it has never been a fighting formation. The confusion in terminology remains today. The British Army still refers to cavalry, artillery, engineer, signals and logistic regiments that are only battalion-sized. This is not just a matter of semantics. A Continental infantry regiment (a system that the U.S. Army also adopted) had the mass of a British brigade, and was capable of being developed into a well-balanced combined arms structure that facilitated the conduct of divisional operations.

At the start of the First World War, Britain deployed four infantry divisions (each of 12 battalions grouped into three brigades) and one cavalry division in its Expeditionary Force on what became known as the Western Front. Although the



infantry division consisted of a number of 'arms', it was not yet a fully combined arms formation. As Kitchener's New Armies of volunteers appeared, the number of divisions steadily rose in total. The German Army division had 12 battalions grouped into four regiments and two brigades. By the time of the battle of the Somme, the Germans were in the process of dispensing with the brigade level and reducing to nine battalions. French divisions had a similar structure. In early 1918, manpower shortages forced the British Army to reduce the number of infantry battalions in each brigade from four to three at a time when the width of the Western Front was being extended. The German Michael offensive hit the over-extended and diluted British Fifth Army particularly hard. The U.S. Army arrived in France in 1917/1918 with divisions of 16 infantry battalions, almost twice the size of the British, French and German divisions.

The British infantry division of the Second World War contained three brigades each of three battalions, a machine-gun battalion (an innovation of the First World War) plus three regiments of close support artillery. By the end of the war, this formation had grown in size and capability, including reconnaissance, anti-aircraft and anti-tank regiments (battalions). Armoured divisions were quite differently structured containing an armoured brigade and a motorised brigade. The former contained three armoured regiments and a motorised infantry battalion. The motorised infantry brigade held three lorried infantry battalions. Reconnaissance, anti-aircraft and anti-tank regiments completed the divisional structure in a similar manner to the infantry division.

Divisional structures evolved in the British Army of the Rhine during the Cold War. Typically three-to-four divisions were subordinated to 1st (British) Corps. In the 1980s, for example, the mobilised Corps comprised three armoured divisions and an infantry division (the latter containing two Territorial Army infantry brigades). Armoured brigades consisted of three-to-four battlegroups, each based on either an infantry battalion or an armoured regiment. In fact, the 'battle group' was in many ways a misunderstood adoption from the German Army. In its original manifestation, the Kampfgruppe was a combined arms formation of variable size (but typically regimental in a German sense) created for a special task. By the end of the

Second World War, however, a Kampfgruppe could equally mean the remnant of a shattered division.

The 1st Armoured Division deployed to Saudi Arabia on Operation Granby in 1990 was an ad-hoc formation. It comprised the 7th Armoured Brigade (two Challenger 1 armoured regiments and a Warrior armoured infantry battalion) and the 4th Armoured Brigade (only one armoured regiment and two armoured infantry battalions). What made this division particularly effective, however, was the amount of integral combat support. This included no fewer than six artillery regiments (one MLRS, one 8-inch [203mm] M110, three 155mm M109 and one Rapier air defence); and three engineer regiments, two close support and one heavy armoured general support. The Division

also received as general support artillery a U.S. Army National Guard brigade (one MLRS, two M109 battalions). The divisional medium reconnaissance regiment, however, was woefully under-equipped with CVR(T) – with insufficient sensors, firepower and protection to undertake its role in an open desert, or anywhere else for that matter. Nearly 30 years later, Ajax will at last provide the necessary set of capabilities!

A division's fighting power rests on far more than its personnel and materiel. It must be trained and well led, following appropriate doctrine. Historical experience shows the importance of collective skills. The 3rd [Infantry] Division in May 1940, for example, was able to conduct a number of complex retrograde operations in its fighting withdrawal to Dunkirk because Montgomery had trained


it accordingly. The 1st Armoured Division under Rupert Smith on Operation Granby underwent a demanding set of command post and formation training exercises in the desert before active operations commenced.

Many challenges face the regeneration of the warfighting division. It requires a balanced set of combat, combat support, combat service support and command support capabilities. Development of the Army 2025 force structure and the warfighting division contained within it will require some hard choices as to what is required, based on a sound concept of employment. Therefore the 'what with?' must follow the 'how to?', and not the other way about.

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A division's fighting power rests on far more than its personnel and materiel...

1st Armoured Division underwent a demanding set of exercises in the desert before active operations commenced



Division in the desert: A Challenger commanded by D Squadron, Royal Scots Dragoon Guards moves into a base camp during Op Granby.
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WARFIGHTING AT SCALE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY

As the title and *raison d'être* of the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research imply, lessons from the past have much to offer the British Army's thinking on future force development. The organisation's latest workshop, which sought to enhance understanding of the requirements and challenges of generating the forces needed to undertake warfighting operations at the divisional level, was serendipitously held a few days ahead of the centenary commemorations of the Battle of the Somme. And although the world, character of conflict and military capabilities have evolved radically since the bloodiest engagement in the history of warfare, the events of 1916 – as alluded to by the Chief of the General Staff – remind the Army to prepare to fight the war it might have to fight.

It will do that in a configuration common to the Great War and entrenched in British tradition – as a division, the lowest level at which the UK military deploys its full orchestra and where operational art is practiced. Despite the dramatic reduction in the number of British divisions from more than 90 during World War One to today's two, the framework remains at the core of the Army's identity. History also provides the Service with several signposts to success by virtue of highlighting past assumptions, miscalculations and mistakes. The Boer War, Op Granby and Op Telic were cited as British case studies that demonstrate the enduring demands on manpower and materials of a divisional deployment. The common lessons from all are the need for critical mass to ensure the British Army is not a "one-shot" weapon, only capable of mounting a single action, and the importance of military planners providing policymakers with a pragmatic appraisal of current assets.

In 3rd (United Kingdom) Division, the UK already has a warfighting division, but there are gaps that will require flexibility and adaptability to fill if future aspirations are to be met. The Regular force's lack of mass and resilience is an acknowledged shortfall and the Army Reserve will be critical to countering this. The 'slice' – the additional effort augmented to support a division in the field – is substantial and equates to more than 10,000 extra personnel. Other areas in need of enhancement include air defence, a deficit that has endured since the Falklands War when sentries spent the majority of their time looking out and up; cyber; and electronic warfare. The latter two of these capabilities are particularly important given advances in technology and the modernisation of near-peer militaries. Resource and budgetary constraints aside, a division's routine training must encompass these fields as today's soldiers may lack the reversionary skills required to operate in an electromagnetic-contested environment and to conduct missions in the event of electronic silence. Similarly, the Army's must have a firm grasp of information operations as they will be operating in a realm of pervasive information unique in military history. While the company responsible for delivering media injects into exercises provides a good representation of traditional media channels, it does not generate the "goldfish bowl" effect and mass of information the Army can expect to have to encounter, filter and counter in a real conflict. Replicating the constant noise

of rolling television news channels, social media and online chatter is difficult but commanders need to be exposed to more than just daily broadcast bulletins.

The generation of a professional and robust opposing force was mooted as a means of aggressively testing the Army's integrated approach doctrine and response to existing and emerging electronic threats. Taking into account that any divisional deployment is likely to be joint, integrated and multinational, the Army does not necessarily need to 'own' a full spectrum of capabilities but it must provide the framework for components

to plug into. A firmer embrace of the Whole Force Approach will further alleviate the strain on those in uniform by adding bulk and specialisms to what is a relatively small force focused on warfighting. Such reliance on industry is common to the majority of Western militaries but further work must be done to integrate civilian contractors in training and planning.

The modular make-up of a division, and the part it plays in any coalition, poses significant command challenges. Staffed by senior and experienced officers and sitting high in the Army's "hierarchy of wisdom", the UK division's headquarters has the mental agility to meet this complex test, but careful communication and co-ordination is key. Inter-operability demands empowered deputies so it is vital the Army, and more specifically a division commander, moulds and finesses the development of staff officers. While the Defence Academy affords its students an excellent education, more needs to be done to supplement training in the mechanics of warfare so that taskings such as assessing an enemy lay down and planning and preparing a divisional march become second nature. There are plentiful exercises that focus on the mobilisation of units, but the execution of deploying a force into a theatre is not routinely practiced, with "time jumps" stepping over this important stage. Ideally, major road, sea and air moves should be rehearsed in the field but, given restraints on schedules and capabilities, wargaming would be an improvement on the status quo. The requirement for an enhanced education extends to the UK's politicians. For a division to successfully fly the flag for Britain, military and policymakers need to demonstrate greater unity. Engaging the political class on exercises will advance understanding of any capability gaps and dispel any misunderstandings about the definitions of notice-to-move and notice-to-effect.

Despite the challenges, the Army's commitment to deliver a heavy warfighting division is far more than an aspiration and much of the restructuring and procurement is in motion. A deployable force capable of handling peer-level threats will be available and equipped with a raft of new equipment including Ajax vehicles and upgraded Apache helicopters, held at readiness. The decision to return to the Army's roots and regenerate the divisional level is not based on nostalgia but necessity. As a natural unit of major power capable of round-the-clock operations and multiple missions, the division's stock is high internationally and affords the UK credibility. Division representation is important if the British Army wishes to preserve its hard-won reputation for being a first-rate army.

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The common lessons are the need for critical mass to ensure the British Army is not a 'one-shot' weapon

THE BIG PICTURE: THE UK WARFIGHTING DIVISION IN CONTEXT

With the 2015 National Security Strategy/Strategic Defence and Security Review, the government recognised the warfighting division as the principal strategic output of the British Army. The division has long been the fundamental unit of large-scale combined arms manoeuvre, but changes in the character of warfare have only cemented its importance as the centrepiece of our national effort on the land.

The role of the division

Since the 18th century, divisions have been a mainstay of European armies; the lowest echelon which had the full panoply necessary for modern warfare, or, as Field Marshal Wavell noted, the level of command that combined the ‘full orchestra’. This is still the case, though with the advent of the information age the array of ‘instruments’ necessary for success has grown. Within the British Army, only at the division-level does one find a commander and staff capable of ‘integrated action’: the deliberate use and orchestration of land force and supporting capabilities and activities to affect actors’ perceptions, physical capability, will and cohesion, in order to change or maintain their behaviour.

A closely-related purpose is the gearing function. In many settings, a brigade staff will not have the staff resources to provide for all its needs, yet a corps staff configured to operate as an operational-level headquarters might not be able to give the proper tactical-level oversight and support. Thus, even if there is not a full division’s worth of capabilities, a two-star commander and staff might be necessary to cohere and enable a collection of smaller units. This is particularly likely in a coalition setting in which coordination, communications and support require constant attention to minute detail.

Finally, the division has a political purpose. It is the principal element of the British contribution to a coalition. Implicit within the aversion to ‘boots on the ground’ is the realisation that the commitment of large numbers of ground forces is the most profound expression of national will. This is important because policy influence comes in proportion with political will and exertion; both history (Ops Granby and Telic) and comparison to our allies suggest that the division is the price of entry into that top tier. Thus, the British contribution to some future coalition endeavour will be largely judged according to the performance of the division. If it is credible and capable enough to be at the forefront, our policy influence will be enhanced. If it fails, is relegated to lesser status or becomes exhausted, that will largely determine the way that the national contribution is viewed.

Possible uses of the division

One indicator of the degree to which the division is the basic currency of significant national effort is reflected by

the many different contexts in which it could be employed. It might serve within a US corps; in that case, the UK division’s ability to bring in close allies and thus reduce the scope of the interoperability problem for the US would make it particularly valuable from the American perspective. It could play a similar role underneath one of the NATO corps-level headquarters. In such an instance, the ‘gearing’ function would be even more important, as those headquarters tend to be smaller and more narrowly focused than a US equivalent. The division could also serve as a land component of a joint task force or as an operational unit in its own right. This wide range of possibilities demonstrates the versatility of the division as the military means of achieving policy effect for the government.

External dependencies

But one consequence of the division’s role as perhaps the key national contribution is that it will be dependent upon many external elements. Some of these are simply functions of the design of the joint force; some capabilities reside within other Services and would be necessary under any circumstances. Yet depending upon the situation, the division’s ability to orchestrate integrated action makes it the socket into which some specialist capabilities from other Services or perhaps even other departments would be placed. The same applies for contributions from allies and partners. In either instance, the ability of the division to perform its role would be greatly enhanced by previous training to create a foundation of procedural and technological interoperability so that not everything must be improvised in theatre. Of course, merely getting to theatre is a challenge

and this is likely to be a key dependency upon others. A division deployment requires a considerable amount of strategic lift and mobility resources; these are always in short supply. Yet in under-developed theatres of operation, the capacity of ports and airports might be even less than that of the available ships and aircraft. In such an instance, prioritisation will be a coalition decision, and a credible, capable division capable of achieving all the roles outlined above will be more likely to find itself at the front of the queue with all of the political benefits that entails.

Conclusion

Historically, the division has been an essential building block of military force, but it has taken on extra operational and political importance as well. The operational importance is due to the multi-faceted demands of modern warfare in which victory requires the integration of multiple kinds of manoeuvre – physical, informational, and electromagnetic – in order to achieve our policy objectives. The political importance is due to the symbolic weight of the division, a level of effort that few others can match and that demonstrates the kind of commitment necessary to have policy influence during momentous events.



Merely getting to theatre is a challenge... a division deployment requires a considerable amount of strategic lift and mobility resources; these are always in short supply

INTERNAL DEPENDENCIES: THE DIVISION IN 2025

When considering the warfighting division, it generally conjures images of 3 (UK) Division. The reality is that while 3 (UK) Division is indeed the core capability, it is significantly reinforced by Force Troops Command, 1 (UK) Division headquarters staff and units. Force generating the warfighting division is a considerable undertaking and is reliant upon a whole-of-Army effort. Honesty, realism and rigour are essential throughout all aspects of the design, development and delivery. A credible and capable testing mechanism for all elements of the division, not just the combat element, is essential as is the capture, recognition and ownership of the associated internal dependency risks.

Generating the force

Setting the demand for generating the force is challenging and an honest representation of the stresses and friction is essential. The last time a division deployed was to Iraq in 2003. Prior to Op Telic 1, the Division had relatively recent experience of deploying through Exercise Saif Sareea 2, and the brigades had routinely deployed to Poland and BATUS [British Army Training Unit Suffield]. Such activity grew experience in operational movement control and staff tables.

Through downsizing and Op Herrick we have lost that experience and need to reset a realistic force generation demand for a division. In this era of persistent engagement, some force elements will need to be generated from their 'in use' configuration and geographic location. Modelling and exercising the mechanics of mounting will help, as will drawing on any residual knowledge and experience from within the Army and the Regular Reserves. The demand should pay particular attention to areas of potential concern such as roles, numbers and 'readiness' of Reserves, contractor reliance, storage arrangements and strategic assets.

Training the division

Training the division is more complex now than previously, due in large part to the size of the Army, available resource and the evolution of the character of warfare. The training systems should be designed to meet the demand signal, and must reflect the realities of 2025 in terms of realistic adversarial capabilities, replication of real-world frictions,

and cater for the whole force, not just the combat element.

Determining the key building blocks of task-organised capability will help to identify the investment balance between scales of effort. An exercise that pits a modern Russian 'full spectrum' force with multiple mortars, rockets and tactical ballistic missiles, UAVs, insurgents, special forces, militias, local governance, capacity building and air parity against a ground manoeuvre brigade with aviation and information manoeuvre capabilities will enable lessons to be learned on how to manoeuvre in such a context. Putting F35/Air (pictured left), Reaper, attack helicopters, Wildcat, Watchkeeper (pictured below), GMLRS, electronic warfare, cyber and Ajax in the same battlespace will improve understanding of the new divisional deep battle – a modern day version of Exercise Flying Rhino. Training should also incorporate the staff officers who will reinforce the headquarters on activation, the whole support element including Reserves and contractors.

Differentiating between which elements are essential for live training, which are desirable and which can be trained in other ways will be important and must enable the core building blocks to operate together. As a central element of integrated action and combined arms manoeuvre, information manoeuvre will be an 'essential' area for live training, necessitating a system that emulates the richness of real-world datasets and interactive agents to allow 'learn by doing' in a modelled environment. Incorporate the requirement to design a single open architecture network for voice and data from operational to tactical levels into training.


Incorporate connectivity for sustainability functions as well as combat elements, and practice how to minimise identifiable emissions and hide within the background noise. Separate out control from command if necessary, and place an emphasis on operating solutions rather than technological solutions. All of this will inform the development of new operational staff work processes and procedures.

In terms of equipment, ensuring simplicity in the operator interface, regardless of the complexity of the equipment, will make training easier, faster and more accessible for Regulars and Reserves alike. Where recognised risk is held in the force structure in particular capabilities, experimentation in training with how to mitigate or minimise them through adaptation is an important early activity.



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Sustaining the force

Sustainment demands require realistic modelling and associated assumptions, rigorous testing and revision. The sustainability friction is often lost in the noise and sustainment requires equal levels of investment in testing, exercising and training this element of the warfighting division. Explore alternative ways of delivering sustainment capability by, for example, contracting delivery of the Vanguard Support Brigade at Readiness. Force projection, stockpiles and interoperability opportunities in sustainment are all areas that warrant exploration as a matter of urgency. More broadly, priorities for interoperability across the warfighting division need to be defined and realistic levels of interoperability requirements at each level set.

Risk

The totality of the above leads to four key Army Board-level risks for action:

● **Generating risk. The complexity in effectively and efficiently reorganising a force which is engaged in operations and ‘in use’ to a warfighting division, and the necessary assurance mechanisms.**

● **Readiness risk.** Balancing the risk across manpower, equipment, training, sustainability, interoperability and information manoeuvre ability to offset vulnerabilities and reinforce strengths.

● **Whole force risk. Primarily the understanding of the compound risk of dependency on contractors and Reserves.**

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We must be alive to the tendency to ‘wish away’ the difficult and more complex elements and avoid focusing on the more comfortable and tangible traditional combat elements that we are currently most familiar with

● **Joint enablers risk.** Whilst an external dependency, the availability (or not) of joint enablers and estimated time to switch prioritisation will impact on the other three internal dependency risks.

These risks and the consequent balance of investment decisions must be underpinned by up-to-date, honest, realistic and rigorous data and assessments. We must be alive to the tendency to ‘wish away’ the difficult and more complex elements and avoid focusing on the more comfortable and tangible traditional combat elements that we are currently most familiar with.

The warfighting division is a collective capability that all contribute to in some form. Although unlike the other Services it is not a single platform, the warfighting division becomes the Army’s version of an ‘exquisite’ capability.

Full-spectrum training: Divisional exercises should feature as much of the Army’s arsenal as possible – including assets such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), argues the author. Nicknamed the ‘70km Sniper’, GMLRS delivers a 200lb high-explosive warhead to its target, with twice the range of other artillery systems used by the British Army. Deployed during Op Herrick, it can fire up to 12 rockets in under 60 seconds

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HOW WILL THE UK DIVISION ORCHESTRATE INTEGRATED ACTION?

The British Army's new doctrinal approach recognises that the expeditious evolution of new technologies has sparked a seminal change in the character of conflict and that its commanders will increasingly find themselves operating in an era of information manoeuvre. At division level, Integrated Action is already part of "everyday" life for the UK's Land Forces and officers have a firm understanding of the process of analysing the audiences relevant to the attainment of an objective; taking a view of the effect they need to achieve on various actors; and then looking into their locker of methodologies to establish the best means of orchestrating those effects to achieve the desired outcome.

The method demands commanders adopt as holistic a view of their operating environments as possible, consider the full spectrum of soft and hard 'levers' available to them, and plan when they are pulled. This balancing of kinetic and non-kinetic actions and synchronisation of tasks falls into the management element of leadership and requires an agility of mind far removed from a "paper, scissors, rock" approach to delivering military effect. Those commanding the warfighting division of 2025 must be cognisant that actions taken by the force – manoeuvre, fires, capacity building and information activity – happen at very different speeds and it would be beneficial for them to be armed with historical analysis of the rates that these elements vibrate. In order to further embed Integrated Action into the British psyche, attendees of the workshop suggested that consideration should be given to the way in which mission statements are written. Including actions, effects and outcomes in orders is likely to help instil a greater understanding across a division's hierarchy of command of who you are choosing to effect and to what end. As with any military doctrine, it is vital to remember that actions and space are contested and that the model of operating needs to account for frictions and the perceptions of your adversary. Your opponent will not share your regard of the plan and all actions should be examined through the lens of the enemy. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that, when there is a contest going on, there might be times when "your own side kicks the ball out of your hands".

Having demonstrated its aptitude for manoeuvre in respect of fire, movement, air and artillery on recent operations, the British Army should not now obsess with those actions of warfare that it already feels comfortable with. Instead, developing capabilities and competence within the 'information activity' component of Integrated Action should be a priority. Recognising the proliferation of media channels and ever-growing importance of the cyber domain to defence and national security, the UK division of the near future must be ready to fight a war and fight facts. Commanders have to accept that we live in an age when "people can read more and do so more quickly" and their actions will be conducted in a "goldfish bowl". Conflict is a global spectator sport – with audiences quick to form an opinion – and maintaining a competitive advantage in such an environment is a significant challenge. Given the sheer volume of information, finding a way of incorporating "this limitless thing" into planning is difficult, but a way must be found to mine data for intelligence.



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Latvian forces have an army of elves ready to counter Russian trolls and, by virtue of training defensively, have an offensive capability

The ARRC is well-versed in how to combine the full spectrum of effects and, with plentiful experience of training multi-nationally, is perhaps more advanced in the field of information operations than most. However, lessons learnt from a recent exercise in Latvia highlight that even the ARRC is a "one-eyed man in the world of the blind" and that the UK requires an uplift in resources. Having established a cyber centre of excellence, Latvian forces have an army of elves ready to counter Russian trolls and, by virtue of training defensively, have an offensive capability. To this end, it was suggested that 77 Brigade – the British unit tasked with using non-lethal engagement and legitimate non-military levers as a means to adapt behaviours of opposing forces and adversaries – would benefit from having a hostile "78 Brigade" to test its mettle on exercise. In a broader training context, it was offered that an historical understanding of why enemies use information operations would provide a foundation for furthering expertise in how to "dispel and deny" opponents' information. It was also felt that a division would benefit from using the real world in training as opposed to fictional scenarios such as Atropia. The technology exists to "rewind history", whitewash elements of it if necessary and to superimpose blocks of data into an exercise. Such a tool would serve to hone the skills of intelligence analysts and allow authentic information to be integrated into a headquarters. There was a consensus that the British Army has given itself "the luxury of not defining the enemy", despite Russia representing one of the biggest threats to NATO, and that it was time to put sensitivities aside and exercise accordingly. Russia, after all, is not shy about its stance of conducting mission rehearsals rather than exercises.

Given that the Army is currently under-resourced in the realm of information activity, expectations of a division's time, space and resource should be bound, with its primary focus in conflict being the tactical fight and warfighting.

FROM CARDIFF TO WARSAW – THE DIVISION IN THE CORPS CONTEXT

Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) is one of eight High Readiness Force (Land) (HRF(L)) HQs within the NATO force structure. It is based in Gloucestershire, with UK as the framework nation and has 21 other nations represented within the staff. It was formed in 1992 as the first of its kind and has three roles: as a Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ, a Land Component Command (LCC) HQ and a Corps HQ.

The ARRC has just completed a period of 12 months on standby as a JTF HQ for a Small Joint Operation (Land), and, had it deployed, it would have had maritime, air, SF task forces and up to a division under command.

The ARRC also has air, maritime and SF staff embedded within the HQ, these provide the 'sockets' for component 'plugs' when deployed on operations. Although it is not a truly joint HQ, the ARRC understands joint activity and joint effect.

Whilst training to be a JTF HQ, the ARRC looked on with interest at the developments within NATO as a result of President Putin's actions in Crimea and Ukraine. At the 2014 Cardiff summit, NATO agreed to create the Enhanced-NATO Response Force (eNRF). The eNRF is a joint force based on land, air, maritime and SF task forces held at graduated levels of readiness. Those at shortest readiness form the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). Within the Land domain, the VJTF(L) is based on a lead brigade; two follow-on brigades are held at longer readiness. The German/Netherlands Corps conducted the initial trial in 2015 and NRDC Spain took up the mantle in 2016, exercising the VJTF(L) on Ex Trident Juncture – the largest NATO field training exercise in a decade. For 2017 the UK is on point and will provide the Air Component Command (ACC), LCC and the core of the VJTF(L). JFC-Naples will be the JTF HQ, Maritime Component Command – STRIKFORNATO, Special Operations Component Command – NSHQ, Air Component Command – UK JFAC, LCC – HQ ARRC, and the VJTF(L) – HQ and

elements of 20 (UK) AI Bde, supported by a range of enablers such as fires, ISTAR, CBRN, CS and CSS. Although no divisional HQ was initially designated as part of the eNRF, the ARRC, and others, are convinced that a two-star level of command is required when the follow-on brigades deploy, due to the span of command which would otherwise be imposed on the LCC. For it is not only the three eNRF brigades but also host nation brigades and possibly in-place brigades which are likely to come under command. It also allows the LCC to remain at the operational/tactical level and the two-star or divisional HQ to concentrate on the tactical battle.

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NATO political guidance has been adjusted. Collective defence is now the principal driver, there is an increased emphasis on all-arms combat and divisions (and corps) are to become the main currency

The ARRC's preparations for the eNRF LCC role started in earnest in 2015 when authority was granted for it to exercise in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for the HQ's annual training exercise, Arcade Fusion. The scenario utilised the lessons identified from Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine, and was set in a sub-Article V hybrid environment. It involved the embryonic NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs), Latvian and Lithuanian JHQs, Host Nation Defence Forces (HNDF), in-place US forces and elements of 4 (US) ID to imitate the in-flow of a two-star HQ, as well as the VJTF(L) and ARRC as the LCC. Lithuania also overlaid their HN exercise (Baltic Host) on Exercise Arcade Fusion in order to explore the requirements for HN support to the eNRF. The lessons identified have helped to inform SHAPE's development of the eNRF concept and the ARRC's preparations for standby.

Preparation will continue this year with Exercise Trident Juncture, where both JFC-Naples as the JTFHQ and the ARRC as the LCC will be evaluated and then certified. The scenario is again based in the Baltics, but this time set within an Article V situation with the deployment of the VJTF and follow-on brigades. This will be an invaluable opportunity to further develop the eNRF concept.

The ARRC and 3 (UK) Div are working very closely together to ensure 20 (UK) AI Bde's HQ and units are prepared for their standby year. Venerable Gauntlet, a





Multinational effort: Helicopter carrier HMS Ocean (above) and Royal Marines using Landing Platform Dock ships and Viking armoured vehicles (opposite) are pictured during Trident Juncture, NATO's largest exercise in 20 years. Held through October and November 2015, predominantly in, over and on the seas around Portugal, Spain and Italy, it was one of a series of long-planned exercises to ensure that NATO allies and their partners are able to work effectively together to deal with any emerging crisis © Crown copyright

field training exercise in September, will be an excellent opportunity for the 14 nations which comprise the 2017 VJTF(L) to exercise together and work through some of the interoperability challenges presented by such a multinational force. It will be followed by a command post exercise, Noble Ledger, where the Brigade HQ will be evaluated and certified as the VJTF(L) HQ.

With the advent of the eNRF, NATO political guidance to the Alliance has also been adjusted. Collective defence is now the principal driver, there is an increased emphasis on all-arms combat and divisions (and corps) are to become the main currency vice brigades. If eNRF forces were considered insufficient, LANDCOM could potentially deploy as the LCC and the in-place HRF(L), such as the ARRC, would revert to being a corps HQ with multiple divisions under command. To that end, the ARRC has been re-examining its role as a corps HQ. Exercise Arcade Thor used a Ukraine-based model, sponsored by the Potomac Foundation, to study how the ARRC might conduct itself as a corps HQ in a warfighting scenario.

The conclusions were instructive. For the corps, it is about creating manoeuvre space for divisions; about prioritising, synchronising and deconflicting, resourcing and enabling, and ultimately, shaping the divisional battle; and it is also about gearing to enable the division to fight the tactical

battle. The exercise also concluded that there are a number of areas in which we need to change our mindset in regard to: risk analysis; force protection – in both physical and virtual domains; operating in a dispersed and fluid battlespace; and to consider the implications of doing so for command and control, logistics, deception and surprise. The study also considered whether we are properly resourced to fight in this type of conflict. The Russians have the ability to conduct combined arms manoeuvre at company group level in a dispersed battlefield with fully-integrated air defence, ISR and fires.

As a result of the corps study period, a more in-depth planning exercise will be run in 2017 to examine the questions raised in Arcade Thor 16. It will take place 20-31 March 2017 and the results from this planning exercise will then inform Arcade Fusion 17, where five divisions (including 3 (UK) Div) will exercise under command of the ARRC in a warfighting scenario. The command post exercise will help develop understanding still further and enable the ARRC to write corps standard operating instructions and procedures.

What is absolutely clear, as the ARRC progresses through its journey from JTFHQ to LCC and soon to be Corps HQ, is that the divisional HQ is a fundamental part of the command and control architecture and therefore a fundamental part of that journey too.

REGULATING RISK TO THE UK'S SOLE WARFIGHTING DIVISION

While it is interesting and instructive to study the structures and capabilities of the UK's previous warfighting divisions, one factor which may demand fresh thinking is that 3 (UK) Div will be our only warfighting division. Although options for regeneration and reconstitution are being considered, we should be very clear about the political pressures we will be under to husband this force. The prospect of 'losing the division in an afternoon' will weigh heavily on the chain of command, with strategic-to-tactical command compression almost inevitable as politicians appreciate the stakes involved in committing the division to battle.

Much work is going into the Division's required structure and capabilities, including its ability to conduct divisional deep/shaping operations. But the truth is that the general officer commanding (GOC) can only do a limited amount to regulate the risk to his own Division. He must be able to regulate risk to his brigades – shaping the enemy in depth; manoeuvring the brigades in concert; sustaining them with adequate resources for their tactical engagements; and moving them out of unfavourable situations or positions. But by the same token only the GOC's superior commander (the corps or Land component commander) is really able to regulate the Division's exposure to risk – modulating 'how much of the battle it should take' and getting it out of trouble when required.

We will of course want to contribute a UK division to a US corps with as few 'caveats' as possible – we will want to be good partners; and we will not want the Division to be used in 'safe' operations that are operationally and strategically irrelevant. So we will most likely need to contribute something at corps level if we are to expect assured support to our force. And if the Division is deployed under the ARRC then we will need to achieve these shaping and sustaining functions in support of our own Division, as well as other allied/partner formations.

This should tell us something about the functions and capabilities we need available at corps (or Land component) level, whether 3 (UK) Div is under US or UK/NATO command. Force Troops Command is principally structured to support 3 (UK) Div [and to a lesser extent 1 (UK) Div]. Large increases in Land environment enablers are likely to be unaffordable within current parameters. So we may have to think more broadly about how to find these corps-level capabilities. There are several options:

- **Use 1 (UK) Div to reduce risk prior to committal of the warfighting division (perhaps by building the capacity of allied/partner forces), as well as delivering additional resilience to 3 (UK) Div once deployed.**

- Seek contributions of corps-level capabilities from allied/partner nations and burden share (eg M3 rigs). Though we may need to re-learn what 'framework' and 'lead' nation responsibilities imply, and we should be careful in assuming



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The Queen Elizabeth-class carrier(s) will be just as totemic as the sole warfighting division

that other nations with smaller defence budgets will be able to generate corps-level capabilities.

- **Support the corps with joint capabilities. Some air and maritime capabilities will have utility in corps shaping and sustaining operations. But the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force are not primarily structured or trained to fight at corps level and they will have their own environmental campaigns to fight, as well as their own challenges in protecting precious elements of their forces. The Queen Elizabeth-class carrier(s) will be just as totemic as the sole warfighting division.**

- Similarly we could employ tier one special forces for this purpose – either as 'corps troops' or as a contribution to the joint force that guarantees assured corps-level support from – for example – US capabilities. Tier one special forces is as a 'strategic' asset. We might need to consider whether regulating risk to the sole warfighting division is in itself a 'strategic' task – but there will inevitably be competing priorities.

- **There could also be potential for the concept of 'information manoeuvre/information dominance' as a (relatively inexpensive) contribution to the corps or Land component level, as both a direct and an indirect means to regulate risk to the UK's warfighting division. This could also offer a means to leverage 'national' assets to deliver tactical effects – as in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

However it is achieved – and we may yet need to revisit the balance between teeth arm capabilities and the enablers that deliver shaping and sustaining operations – we must be able to regulate how much risk our sole warfighting division is exposed to, unless we are prepared to lose it.

WHAT CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS IMPLY FUTURE RISK FOR A UK DIVISION BY 2025 AND BEYOND?

With the precise nature of any future fights, threats and theatres unknown, judging the potential consequences of contemporary capability gaps on a warfighting division of tomorrow poses a significant challenge. For example, will the UK division of 2025 be deployed as a lone, unsupported force or as part of a larger multinational coalition with the backing of a benevolent host nation? Equally, could intervening Strategic Defence and Security Reviews dramatically reimagine the requirements of a British Army division? However, acknowledging that any future formation must be agile and adaptable and that a division optimised for a solitary mission is an unsatisfactory solution, attendees of the study day flagged the following risks:

Prepare

Even when assuming any division-level deployment will be in a joint and multinational context with trusted and familiar partners, the UK must not adopt an overly-optimistic outlook in respect of manpower and resilience in support of an operation. History – as evidenced by the Boer War and Op Granby – has highlighted the dangers of doing so. The same is true in relation to sustainment; the Army will need to ensure it has the ability to hold the required stock and not only pursue procurement once the action has begun.

Further staff and field training will help refine requirements and

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Without a significant investment in additional air and sea platforms, a UK warfighting division would need external assistance to reach a conflict zone, whether in the form of logistical support from across the Atlantic, a fleet of civilian ships requisitioned for government use – as was the case in the Falklands – or by exploiting commercial sources

act as an examination of the planning assumptions contained in the *Staff Officers' Handbook*. The importance of such a test was demonstrated by Ukraine's recent experience, where artillery expenditure in battle proved much higher than anticipated pre-war. A lack of readiness is directly linked to a lack of resources and ring fencing the necessary budget to maintain manning levels and deliver realistic field training is paramount.

Project

The ability to get an entire division's component parts swiftly and safely into a theatre of operations was identified as a key concern, particularly in territories benefiting from a robust anti-access/area denial strategy. Deploying to a high-threat environment – in which a variety of platforms intended to deter and delay external intervention have been fielded – is an undertaking unfamiliar to veterans of contemporary campaigns and, as a result, the consequences of doing so may not be fully understood by UK military and political planners.

Aside from the serious questions posed by anti-ship ballistic missiles and the like, the logistical challenge of moving an entire division is substantial. The British Army has conducted detailed planning of a division move to embarkation points and is confident it is equipped with the necessary assets, but there was a consensus that the UK does not have an adequate strategic lift capability to transport a large-scale fighting force and its stores.

Without a significant investment in additional air and sea platforms, a UK warfighting division would need external assistance to reach a conflict zone, whether in the form of logistical support from across the Atlantic, a fleet of civilian ships requisitioned for government use – as was the case in the Falklands – or by exploiting commercial sources. One potential problem posed by the latter solution is that of availability, as evidenced by the recovery of British equipment from Afghanistan. If allies are attempting to task the same assets in support of their own deployments, the UK may find itself jostling for position in a long queue.



Similar concerns were shared regarding intra-theatre lifts and the movement of materials from surface and aerial ports of debarkation to the deployed division. Citing current NATO concerns about rail stocks, the group questioned if there were enough heavy equipment transporters (HETs) to run simultaneous in-load and off-load of supplies in the UK and theatre respectively. The scale and complexity of the logistical challenge were highlighted by earlier discussions, which alluded to the array of assets and systems required to sustain and support a division on its way to war. For example, the need to conduct river or wide gap crossings would place significant demands on bridging equipment, which may be required to operate a main supply route as well as combat operations. It was also noted that the current British Army arsenal assumes that amphibious combat vehicles will be a partner capability. The incoming fleet of Ajax armoured fighting vehicles (*pictured right*) will, however, boast advanced mobility, survivability and situational awareness systems.



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Other capabilities likely to be stretched by a divisional deployment are ground-based air defence (GBAD) platforms and ever-in-demand information, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets. In a contested environment, the former are highly likely to be called upon to protect surface and aerial ports of debarkation in addition to combat forces. Seamless communication information systems that work across division and brigade boundaries will be vital.

Inform

The British Army has become accustomed to having invaluable ISTAR support in the field and it is vital this capability endures. Planners will need to be conscious of the range and survivability of current platforms so that systems deliver regardless of the geographical framework. How a unit such as 77th Brigade – which is tasked with using non-lethal engagement and legitimate non-military levers as a means to adapt behaviours of adversaries – will support a division's information operations is yet to be tested but the concept was hailed as a positive step.

In a broader sense, the ability to 'own' a plan from corps down to brigade level was considered a powerful tool that would assist with cohesion if delegation of authority is clearly defined and understood. The issue of intelligence dissemination throughout a division can be problematic, but it was suggested there was a relatively quick and inexpensive fix, with a platform similar to the US Army's cloud-based data platform [Distributed Common Ground System] mooted as a solution.

Protect

There was a shared view that the British Army as a whole needs to become reacquainted with in-theatre counter-surveillance techniques. The Army's campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were characterised by a focus on counter-insurgency and, as a consequence, the UK has not rigorously rehearsed tactical deception measures against a near-peer threat for some time. Exercising this craft at all levels – from troop camouflage and concealment to the evasion of enemy satellites – will help to identify any equipment and training shortfalls. Field decoys have been used to great effect against

British forces in the past and a proficiency at identifying and exploiting such capabilities could provide Britain's warfighting division of 2025 with a battle-winning advantage.

At the tactical level, counter mobility and anti-armour were raised as areas of concern. A British division can expect to encounter the former despite not using mines or sensor-fused weapons itself and the latter capability, while very good at a range of up to two kilometres, is limited over greater distances.

The myriad threats posed by hybrid warfare mean a division engaging with an enemy must be mindful of the risks posed to its rear echelons. In addition to providing protection to assets away from the front, commanders will need to ensure logistics vehicles and movement plans are safeguarded from opposing forces. An expansive area of operation will also demand a distributed command and control model in order to assist with the protection and output of a division's headquarter assets. The leadership will need to determine where and how much of its capability should be deployed forwards as opposed to operating out of sanctuary areas.

It was accepted that the electronic element of warfare is an area of expertise the Army must master and should exercise to better understand both defensive and offensive measures.

Sustain

As previously referenced, there are questions that will need to be addressed over the numbers and locations of logistics vehicles within the wider Army. The current fleet of HETs is due for replacement and the quantity of vehicles required will therefore be a contentious issue in need of serious consideration.

From a medical perspective, it was acknowledged that the UK's forward chain on operations is a politically-charged subject and that the specialist skills honed during Ops Herrick and Telic are of an excellent standard. However, could such high levels of care be maintained in the wake of a major engagement? In common with the other areas of risk identified, a division's medical capability is difficult to test. Training that authentically exercises the scale and interoperability elements of a large-scale warfighting deployment are demanding on equipment, manpower and budgetary resources, and hard to plan and execute.

BEING READY FOR WARFIGHTING AT SCALE – LESSONS LEARNED AND TODAY’S CHALLENGES

When commenting on the appeal for National Service in 1939, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stated that “it is a scheme to make us ready for war” and said: “That does not mean that I think war is coming. You know I have done all I can to preserve peace for ourselves and others. We would never begin a war, but might be forced to participate in a war begun by others, or might be attacked if the Government of another country thought we could not defend ourselves; therefore the better we are prepared, the less likely is it that any aggressor will try an adventure in which the chances of success would be so unpromising¹.”

His statement clearly captures the timeless multiple paradoxes of being prepared for a large-scale war: maintaining the drive to ensure peace in the world; providing stability and a sense of security to our public while raising the possibility of a conflict on the horizon; and sending a message to potential adversaries that we would be able to match their threats, yet at the same time assuring that our priority is peace and not aggression.


It is also interesting to note his argument that we might be attacked or might be forced to participate in a war begun by others. Perhaps, it is the latter that is still a possibility for the UK: we might not be facing an immediate risk of a direct attack by a foreign state, but there are a few plausible scenarios in which our allies or smaller countries of strategic importance for us facing aggression, are engaged in such a way that could result in our own entry into a war that we did not foresee as a direct risk for us.

This raises an important question: is the British Army ready for such a possibility? If one merely sees preparedness through net manpower and kinetic force capacity, the answer might be a simple ‘no’: the British Army is at its smallest and has faced years of budget cuts. Yet such a speedy conclusion does not help us with strategic thinking beyond a *fait accompli*, nor does it enable the planning that is required of the Army to be ready to face known and unknown future threats. Therefore, we need to reflect on what it means to be ready for a large-scale war; and it is timely to look at a prime example of it in our history, and reflect upon what this means for us now.

What does it mean to be ready for war?

Following Clausewitz, if war is the continuation of policy by other means, then ultimately preparedness for war is also

¹As cited in “*Making Britain Ready for War: Appeal for Volunteers for National Service*”, *The Advocate*, 25 January 1939.



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political. Political intentions, aims, milieu, strategic visions, political ideas dominating the day and the personal outlooks of policy-makers all play a crucial role. They influence formation of perceptions of threats and opportunities, costs and means that are deemed to be acceptable, outcomes seem to be desirable.

Secondly, it is social: without public support and participation, and shared animosities and threat perceptions, no military in the world can be ready or able to execute a large-scale war. Their attitudes shape politics, risk aversion, supply chains, moral courage and the motivation of soldiers.

Thirdly, it is economic: wars are costly to run and maintain. The feeding of large armies, supply of ammunition and transportation of substantial resources are required to maintain the military momentum. Only after these are addressed does the question of capacity emerge: military muscle that can match the threats of its adversary. Even if an army has adequate skills and mass, without the political, social and economic factors behind it, it cannot perform.

One could argue that most large-scale wars have ended in victory or defeat not because of the utter destruction of a peer-army, but because of the political, social and economic supports that maintained its momentum, capacity and adaptation. With this in mind, we can now turn to British experiences in World War One before offering some thoughts on current challenges.

World War One

As we commemorated the centenary of the Battle of Somme, the unprecedented rate of casualties alone raises the preliminary conclusion that the Army was not ready for World War One, at least at its outbreak. However, one needs to look back at the Haldane reforms and the desire of the governments of the time to prepare the nation for future wars following the perceived failures of the South African Wars (1899-1902).

The war was costly, with substantial financial costs and more than 20,000 deaths, and only with the substantial provision of additional resources were the initial defeats turned around. The experience had not only raised the need for military reform, but also created public and political aversion to both military expenditure and to war. The 1903 and 1904 royal commissions had highlighted the failures during the Boer Wars, and led to a series of attempts at reform, both through proposals by multiple committees and by successive Conservative war ministers.

Yet it was the reforms by Richard Burdon Haldane, Secretary

of State for War (1905-1912), that enabled substantial changes in the structure and orientation of the Army. Haldane sought to reduce the defence budget by withdrawing particular garrisons and cutting back battalions, as well as by restructuring the forces in line with his government's commitment to handle the economy better and to cut excesses. Most significantly, the reform attempted to achieve this through the creation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) – a professional and well-trained strike force with a focus on overseas deployment – and a Territorial Force, that drew from volunteers, militia and yeomanry to support the regular force in war but with a focus on home-front defence.

The BEF marked a unique change in the Army's deployment model; previously smaller units were sent abroad to join formations or were organised into larger units when they arrived in theatre, whereas the BEF meant organising and training at larger numbers at home prior to deployment, with the understanding that there might have to be immediate operations and the use of force requiring such a large-scale deployment across the Empire.

In modern terms this meant genuine readiness and preparedness: an ability to deploy when required without the need for mission-specific training as a top-up before crossing the line of departure. He also actively campaigned for public support and for volunteers, including the introduction of the Officers' Training Corps in schools and universities, with a plan to raise some 312,000 reserves for the Territorial Force, a goal which he could not reach².

Public fear of an invasion due to the German naval build-up had caused a jump in recruitment into the Force in 1909-1910. In 1913, the Force was already crumbling, with thousands not showing up to the annual camp for training, and only a small portion of the force had taken the Imperial Service obligation that would enable them to go abroad in the event of mobilisation.

By July 1914, there were 268,777 officers and soldiers in the Force, of which only 18,683 had accepted the Imperial Service abroad³. With the declaration of war, however, the Army expanded substantially between 1914 and 1916 through large-scale voluntary recruitment under Lord Kitchener's direction (who is often attributed to have been unique in his stand that the war would last a few years, not merely months as the conventional view suggested), then through conscription from 1916 to 1918, eventually reaching to some four million soldiers.

By the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain had a regular Army with skills, discipline and professionalism that it had not known before. It was able

²[rusi.org/commentary/learning-haldane https://medium.com/the-bridge/peacetime-restrains-strategy-28657409266d](https://medium.com/the-bridge/peacetime-restrains-strategy-28657409266d)

³*Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Army: the Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916*

to deploy, operate and function at an unprecedented scale. The weaknesses of the Haldane reforms, and thus the preparedness of the Army for the war ahead, were not so much about the structures, but about the new technologies and capacities of the peer-adversary and the scale of war itself. Neither prolonged trench warfare, nor the effectiveness of machine guns and the use of chemical weapons could have been adequately prepared for.

At the strategic level, the possibility of a large continental war had not been anticipated and a focus on the management of the Empire had meant a keen focus on naval forces. Yet World

War One is also a testimony not only to how quickly the Army had learned and adapted to the challenges that it faced, but how quickly and deeply the public rallied behind the campaign, at substantial military and civilian loss, including the equally substantial economic fallout.

It is interesting to note the social and political patterns similar to the pre-Great War era in the lead-up to World War Two. The doctrine of a '10 years rule' that the Army should manage itself as if no major war would be on the horizon within ten years had become a taken-for-granted assumption that no such large-scale war was possible again, at least in the foreseeable short term. The public dismay over the unprecedented numbers of casualties also played a part in shaping political views. Yet, a year before World War Two, Britain was already preparing for a mass-scale war, this time to be fought not only in foreign fields, but on the home front and this required engagement with civilians.

Technological advances meant that the enemy would be able to strike home targets, thus civilians would be at risk. Therefore civilians had to be prepared for aerial bombings, supply shortages, chemical attacks and even a nuclear strike. These required physical preparations and planning, but also the raising of awareness and public participation in the strengthening of the home front. Also, networks were built up for civilian defence in the scenario of a foreign invasion. Thus, some 20-plus years after World War One, the Army not only once again saw a massive increase in manpower, both in its regular and reserve forces, but war preparedness took on a new meaning in the preparation of society for a war beyond traditional expectations of a society's role in supporting campaigns fought abroad.

Implications for today

The key lesson we learn from this is that we can never simply assume that we won't face yet another large-scale war, and that the kind of preparedness that is required is not merely about producing structural plans to increase numbers of soldiers. If one surveys the global developments from Russian resurgence, to precarious conditions in the Balkans, to more than 30 states that are seen to be at risk of collapsing, to some 60 million people in the world who are refugees



The Army expanded substantially between 1914 and 1916 through large-scale voluntary recruitment under Lord Kitchener's direction (who is often attributed to have been unique in his stand that the war would last a few years, not merely months as the conventional view suggested), then through conscription from 1916 to 1918, eventually reaching to some four million soldiers

and stateless persons, through irregular migration, resource competition, deforestation and droughts, religious militancy, to the re-emergence of far right populism, there is every reason to worry that while no country might directly declare war against the UK, the UK might find itself drawn into a large-scale war alongside its allies.

Yet, if such an occasion occurs, the context within which warfare will be played will be different than at any other time before; ease of information flows, global news reporting, international human rights organisations, and a deadly mix of short-term politics and populism not only bring restraints for legitimate reasons but could also undermine necessary military efforts and tactics.

They also make the business of making a case for a moral basis for embarking upon campaigns much more difficult than ever before. Information and perception battles as well as the protection of cyber structures, and their weaponisation, against an adversary will be a key aspect of the future invisible wars (but with highly-visible outcomes).

Future combat is likely to take place in crowded urban settings, with a high risk of civilian casualties and serious challenges to undertaking campaigns while minimising losses. Such contexts would lead to a dispersion of fighting formations, units and sub-units, as large movements and

heavier kinetic force capacities would not be possible. Under such conditions, the mass required to meet an enemy will require complex and small networks of supplies, medical evacuation and communication. These create new vulnerabilities for forces with higher risk of casualties.

Such probabilities of future wars require serious considerations here and now, even though no mass war might seem to be on our horizon for ‘the next 10 years’. The British Army has a long tradition of adapting to new challenges and restructuring itself to meet new challenges. Thus, with adequate wisdom and foresight, political support (if not, with political champions of military reform like Haldane) and finance, it can do whatever is within its means to plan and structure for a sudden increase of numbers, increased procurement, new formations of units and new skills for its fighters.

These, however, are undermined by pressures on the defence budget, as economic uncertainties loom, just like it was before and after both world wars, but also by public attitudes that have been shaped by a prolonged era of peace, prosperity and personal consumerism. In no other era was peace so assumed as a given as it is now, and were fatalities and casualties seen as so unacceptable. To communicate the necessity of war preparedness within such a climate is the main challenge that waits any strategic planning by the Army.

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Societal strength: The author argues that without public support and participation, and shared animosities and threat perceptions, no military in the world can be ready or able to execute a large-scale war. Their attitudes shape politics, risk aversion, supply chains, moral courage and the motivation of soldiers. In sharp contrast to the British public's attitude to the First and Second World War, the UK's campaign in Iraq continues to attract public criticism

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SUMMARY: RECONSTITUTING MASS OR MITIGATING FOR ITS ABSENCE

For a generation of soldiers who have earned their stripes in theatres characterised by counter-insurgency operations, and a society sold a sanitised picture of concise, clinical conflicts, the scale and nature of the warfare witnessed on the Somme 100 years ago is almost unimaginable. Over the course of five months in 1916, around 2.5 million men fought for the British Expeditionary Force as it attempted to seize territory from resolute German lines in a battle that claimed more than one million lives. Advancements in technology and capabilities may mean such a protracted war of attrition is never repeated, but the bloodiest engagement in military history still poses pertinent questions of today's Armed Forces. It is arguable that the British Army of 2016 favours a "low-risk", "low initiative" style of operation and has become too used to fighting on its terms and at a time of its choosing. But what if a "Somme-esque" army was needed? How would a Service, 112,000 strong when fully manned, scale up in order to win a war of national interest against a near-peer enemy? How would it recruit and resource such a force? And if it can't, do military planners have the flexibility of thought to mitigate mass?

History, of course, provides hints to some potential answers, not least in respect of generating manpower and the use of Reserve forces. The Battle of the Somme saw the first involvement in the Great War of many men who had volunteered for Army service, including those in Pals battalions. Having completed around a year of training, infantry units made up of friends, relatives and workmates from the same communities deployed to the Western Front and the Battle of the Somme was the first to be fought by a largely citizen army. Despite their battlefield inexperience, there were no AWOL issues on the eve of battle and the civilian volunteers acquitted themselves well. Indeed, as both sides fought intensely for every yard of ground the citizen army began to evolve into a battle-hardened and highly-effective force.

However, the world wars also provide cautionary notes on Territorial Army engagement. By the time the country again found itself at war with Germany in 1939, the effectiveness of the British Army's Reserve contingent had been eroded. Half the size of its First World War counterpart at 100,000 men and comparatively poorly trained and equipped, the Reserves arguably suffered as a consequence of ill-conceived War Office orders. Conscious of the need for mass, the government instructed units to double in size but offered no guidance and resources to enable this. The growth crippled many formations, diluting what little cohesion had remained in the wake of the Great War. There were notable exceptions and success stories, principally originating from those units boasting strength in numbers pre-war and which had benefited from training together for a sustained length of time, but – in a generation – the Reserves had sustained a moral

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What if a 'Somme-esque' army was needed? How would a Service, 112,000 strong when fully manned, scale up in order to win a war of national interest against a near-peer enemy? How would it recruit and resource such a force?



Educated ensemble: A company from a Public Schools Battalion – raised as part of Kitchener's Army – prior to the Battle of the Somme © Ernest Brooks/CIWM (Q.796)

decline. Whether chastened by the realities of the First World War or the product of poor planning, the Territorial Army's appetite for action proved a frustration to commanders and – in a bid to put an end to the extraordinarily high surrender rates affecting the Eighth Army in North Africa – prompted Montgomery to implement a "no retreat" order ahead of the battle for El Alamein.

In contrast, civilian soldiers in Australia's 9th Division staged a heroic stand at Tobruk. The Antipodean army's command structure was designed around regional reserve units who trained, deployed and fought together. This evidence suggests that, as is the case for full-time soldiers, comradeship is key to the effectiveness of Reserves on operations and is borne out by the American experience.

In Vietnam, the US Army paid little attention to esprit de corps, adding masses of conscripted troops to a Regular spine with little regard to regional or cultural background. This mix further degraded the morale of the men fighting and public support for an already hugely unpopular conflict. Fast forward to the current day and America's National Guard is seen as central to the function of the Regular Army. Used predominantly for civil resilience tasks, units deploy as formed bodies rather than individual augmentees and enjoy the benefits of strong community support. The National Guard draws on and instils a sense of local pride, has no problems recruiting and is the glue between the US Army and the civilian world.

The British Army's recent approach to utilising its Reserves has been mixed. While Operation Granby saw TA personnel deployed as both formed units and to backfill Regular units, the campaign in Afghanistan heavily favoured the augmentee model. Army Reserves served with distinction on Op Herrick and there are clear arguments in favour of individual postings

in specialist fields, not least in the medical sphere where Reservists can bring their extensive professional expertise to bear. However, the morale of the Reserves should clearly not be disregarded if the UK wishes to retain and increase numbers in peacetime and in the event of war. After all, team cohesion is cherished in the Regular ranks, as highlighted by one senior officer who volunteered that his lone experience of a tour as an augmentee was the most “uncomfortable and unpleasant” period of his Army career.

Perhaps as important as the issue of how Reservists should be deployed in the future is the question of how many Britain could muster. The answer would ultimately be dictated by the UK population’s appetite to respond to any escalation towards a war of national interest, but one attendee of the study day suggested that Cold War-level manning [circa 240,000 personnel] was not beyond the nation’s reach. Such a growth in numbers would certainly send a strong strategic message to any potential adversary but there is a risk it could be perceived as an act of aggression rather than deterrence.

Mass does not necessarily have to manifest itself as boots on the ground and, with no dramatic increase in funding on the horizon, the British Army must strengthen its understanding of other critical multiplying factors. One hundred years ago, the mud of the Somme tested the mental agility of commanders who were forced to reassess and hone artillery and infantry tactics and integrate new weaponry, including tanks, into operating procedures. Those officers charged with delivering and commanding Joint Force 2025 face an even tougher examination of their conceptual credentials than their forebears. They must find a way of doing bigger and better in a smarter way, while also accepting the world will not stop and wait for the British military.

The prospect of defending national interests against a near-peer threat will require the Army to reawaken to the concept of corps-level operations. Much of the Service’s existing doctrine, education and training is capped at divisional level and yet the UK is most likely to find itself operating as part of, or possibly commanding, such a formation. Distracted by counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan for a decade, the British Army must now refocus on the level at which a

division’s full orchestra can deliver a deafening crescendo. Doing so will not simply mean relearning the lessons of the Cold War but getting to grips with how to operate and master command and control in a contemporary environment – a congested and contested battlespace where no clear lines exist between enemy combatants and mass populations. The cyber threat, pervasiveness of the media and management of a force’s digital footprint are all challenges the Service does not yet comprehend.

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Switching from a FOB mindset of wanting to build higher walls to regaining the initiative through a combination of tempo and tolerance of failure will not come easily


Switching from a FOB [forward operating base] mindset of wanting to build higher walls to regaining the initiative through a combination of tempo and tolerance of failure will not come easily. Furthermore, a thorough examination of how best to equip the Army is required. Urgent operational requirements have led the UK military down the route of relatively quick fixes but a corps commander will have different demands to address. Managing equipment levels against a future, unknown threat will be difficult but thought has to be applied to the nation’s ability to surge production or source arms

and armour at scale in the event of a major conflict. With industrial capability in the UK itself in need of reconstituting, production priority for the Army could be an issue if the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy are also competing for parts and support. If components are being bought from overseas, sovereignty issues could come into play and see the Army waiting at the back of a very long queue or worse still denied equipment entirely.



Although effective at operating within a counter-insurgency framework, the Army lacks some of the tools that would be required against a threat from the East. Mobility, counter mobility, information operations and air defence are among the current capability gaps but the UK also boasts a number





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Prejudices over traditional means of training and the use of technology on the battlefield will need to be suspended. A fundamental change in thinking is required to reconstitute to scale and that may mean exploring possibilities such as putting air-to-air missiles on commercial aircraft, equipping snipers with multiple, remotely-controlled rifles or forming a professional opposing force to rigorously test the Army’s fighting divisions and doctrine

of significant strengths. When a potential opponent looks at Britain they will see innovation, a good economic and industrial base and mass at national level.

The missing mass within the Army itself implies the need for inter-operability and multinational partners. Britain does not face a standing start in this regard and having enduring allies provides a valuable insurance policy against a future “shock” that cannot be defined. There are, however, compound capability gaps and the Army must assess if its methods of command and control can be easily plugged into an international framework – whether as a junior or lead partner.

Importantly, it must be remembered that the regeneration of existing formations to combat readiness and reconstitution – the growth of new capabilities and units – are not the Army’s plans to own. Both will require a Whole Force Approach in the broadest sense, with buy-in from the Regulars, Reserves, politicians, industry and society. For this to happen there must be a cultural change within the corridors of the Ministry of Defence when it comes to communication. An engaging discussion with society is needed, but the military is being denied a social conversation by the defensive approach of Main Building and adoption of an adversarial dynamic with the media. This lack of public dialogue has been further

exacerbated by the Army’s geographic switch to “super garrisons”. While providing a firm base for personnel and their families is rightly seen to be important, the move has dramatically reduced the Service’s political footprint.

Conceptualising the horrors of the first day of the Somme – when British forces suffered 57,470 casualties – a century on may prove difficult, but such an imagination is needed now if the Army is ever to come close to reconstituting such mass again or mitigate for its absence.

Whether mass in 2025 reveals itself as an expanded and more closely integrated Regular and Reserve force or a smaller, more agile Army aided by specialist Sponsored Reserves mobilised by industry, modern military minds must be exercised to find a workable and affordable solution.

Prejudices over traditional means of training and the use of technology on the battlefield will need to be suspended to do so. A fundamental change in thinking is required to reconstitute to scale and that may mean exploring possibilities such as putting air-to-air missiles on commercial aircraft, equipping snipers with multiple, remotely-controlled rifles or forming a professional opposing force to rigorously test the Army’s fighting divisions and doctrine.

REGENERATION AND RECONSTITUTION: REFLECTIONS FOR PLANNING

This short paper reflects on the second CHACR warfighting at scale study day, covering reconstituting mass or compensating for its absence. Its aim is not to summarise each of the wide-ranging contributions, but to draw conclusions for Army planning.

Definitions are challenging and very much a work in progress. Many at the study day seemed to agree that the most useable concepts were to view regeneration as replicating the force structure and capability required to meet unchanged outputs; reconstitution as growing the force structure beyond current norms. Also that some form of strategic shock will be the catalyst for reconstitution; while regeneration is more routine – a consequence of the myriad ways in which demand could exceed planned supply. Therefore, regeneration is the business of Defence; reconstitution of the nation at large.

Tackling reconstitution first, the front end of a strategic framework for it is not too hard to conceive. Warnings and indicators cue decision points left of, or at least as close as possible to, the ‘bang’ thereby initiating funded and rehearsed contingency plans. Together they create a national demand signal which results in institutional mobilisation of targeted elements of society and industry that are already fully bought into the plan. Presumably, if the bang is loud enough to warrant reconstitution, the rules of the game change too, resulting in some form of complementary and compelling legislation in areas such as enlistment, industrial prioritisation and military use of the national estate.

Of course that’s easy to write; just planning any part of it will prove extremely demanding and must involve many national actors. But it shouldn’t be a leap of faith; the main reason we think we might be able to do it is that there is ample historical precedent (that said the challenge to like-for-like reconstitution posed by procuring ever more complex equipment and then training on it from a standing start is just one of many that might temper the utility of historical yardsticks). Much harder to envision is the culture of popular support that history tells us is a prerequisite: underpinning what is fundamentally an act of political will. It will be important when generating forces to sustain an enduring operation; vital when moving up the spectrum of ambition to transformative ways of delivering military effect – be it innovative capabilities, fluid force structures or something we haven’t yet imagined.

Positive and oft-cited military approval ratings and the increasingly sophisticated measures evident in our strategy to better connect the Army to society are obviously important. But it seems unlikely healthy crowds at freedom parades and an upturn in recruiting are adequate indicators for

national will as it would relate to reconstitution. Again, it’s easy to note that a sense of war of the people is critical to commitment – perhaps from a high of the British Volunteer Army in 1914-15 to a low of the US in Vietnam by 1969 – but harder to judge how even that unifying sense would resonate today with a diffuse and diverse audience. All the more so in an era when the most comprehensive and hard-won shaping campaign can be undone in seconds by contrary opinion-formers. So, while we must have a plan, we shouldn’t presume to understand the context in which we might have to enact it.

Defence policy directs the Army to plan for regeneration and reconstitution now in response to a Strategic Defence and Security Review which recognised a changed security context and, consequently, demands forces capable of responding to all likely threats. Any analysis of that review would suggest it’s most likely we would execute that plan either in the event of an enduring operation in excess of Defence planning assumptions, or a major war as a consequence of renewed state-based aggression – but one which falls short of representing an existential threat to national survival. Without the commitment derived from historical levels of engagement and accepting the UK will remain post-conscription, it is not plain to see what incentives and controls exist to exert political will and how effective they might be. Therefore, it’s hard not to share in the conclusion that reconstituting a mass army supported by a mobilised Defence-industrial base is simply not a credible contemporary concept.

Of course we would all hope the outlook is not as bleak as that, and perhaps the start point is to define a more modest form of reconstitution, in the context of multiple threats. Notwithstanding the intent of the current concurrency sets, ultimately warfighting at scale is a binary output. More conceivable is a reconstituted force being required to meet a simultaneous, but different and probably lesser, threat. Of these perhaps most likely for the UK is a dramatic change in the form of domestic terrorism – be it as a consequence of Islamic extremism, dissident republicanism or anything else.

Noting the outreach to society in France following the recent atrocity in Nice, homeland resilience does seem to be a more credible pretext for national engagement than far-away wars. Clearly, a force structure able to counter multiple threats without denuding the expeditionary forces capable of, and ready to, conduct warfighting at scale is also central to a truly deterrent posture. So, while history encourages us to think of reconstitution in terms of providing the resilience for a return to warfighting at scale, perhaps we need a plan for it more as a consequence of that policy choice.

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Without the commitment derived from historical levels of engagement and accepting the UK will remain post-conscription, it is not plain to see what incentives and controls exist to exert political will and how effective they might be. Therefore, it’s hard not to share in the conclusion that reconstituting a mass army supported by a mobilised Defence-industrial base is simply not a credible contemporary concept



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Positive and oft-cited military approval ratings and the increasingly sophisticated measures evident in our strategy to better connect the Army to society are obviously important. But it seems unlikely healthy crowds at freedom parades and an upturn in recruiting are adequate indicators for national will as it would relate to reconstitution

Whether or not these assertions around reconstitution are deemed to be valid, the most tangible point for the Army to start planning would seem to be with limited goals for regeneration. Some will legitimately observe that planning and investment must prioritise existing capability gaps – this being the lowest form of regeneration. But, in the context of new Defence policy, a plan for regeneration would be enacted if the Army is required, at notice measured in months, to flex its strategic outputs from concurrency to enduring intervention. So it seems reasonable to set the level of ambition at a framework of a second division, albeit one which could not reasonably be structured and equipped exactly like the 3rd (UK) Division conceived by Army 2020 Refine (representing as it does the head mark for capability development). By setting the aiming mark there, like the division itself, the plan will be scalable and modular.

Step one might be not forgetting what we know already. Albeit at smaller scale, our recent operational planning is defined by endurance and the implications for sustainment back as far as our supply partners are well understood. Step two might be identifying the irreducible minimum capabilities and components of force structure which represent the seed corn of divisional outputs, assessed in the context of the most likely scenarios. Most seem to agree that

upper tactical and operational command and control would be a good place to start.

Clearly going any further than that paper contingency plan begins to cost money – be it modest additional stockpiles or selective and specialist over training of Reserves. The exhortation to think imaginatively is a reasonable one, but it's still hard to see any element of regeneration coming cheap. That brings it into competition with readiness for operations at smaller scale and modernisation and, obviously in discussion with Defence, we should expect a dose of realism as to where it fits into the current strategic balance of investment. Nonetheless, and Chilcot notwithstanding, it would be nothing short of negligent not to plan now, not only for the war we might have to fight – but for the second-order effects of doing so.

The conclusions of the CHACR study day shine a light on the specific areas within the force structure and offset capabilities on which we might focus our efforts. But it also identified many other areas that the Army must bring forward into its planning, perhaps chief among them that it is our allies in a NATO context who will first compensate for our lack of mass, and the pressing need to re-examine the demand signal for the Regular Reserve.

THE ROLE OF THE RESERVES IN RECONSTITUTION AND REGENERATION

Reserves will be an integrated part of any significant force the British Army deploys – either to contribute specialist skills, to provide units or sub-units delivering particular military capabilities needed for the operation, or simply to thicken the Regular force. Indeed some Reservists – military intelligence for example – may well have been used even in a period of rising tension. So some Reserves will have been employed long before we make contact. However, this paper looks only at bringing in Reservists to expand and sustain our 2025 headmark – the warfighting division.

Background

Volunteers have formed a vital part of British ground forces for hundreds of years. Reserves – volunteer military forces – predate a standing regular army. It would perhaps be fanciful to claim that the Saxon Fyrd was a sort of reserve, but the London-trained bands of the 15th Century – from which the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC) claims ancestry – have all the characteristics of volunteer military service.

The British have long-standing antipathy for standing armies. Perhaps this is because they are considered to be expensive when not being used, or possibly – with an eye on continental experience – because of a fear that they may get above themselves and seize political control. The last time we allowed this to happen was a long time ago, in 1649, but they did cut the king's head off. Traditionally, even the threat of invasion – which was pretty real throughout the 19th century – was met by the formation of yeomanry cavalry and volunteers. By 1806 there were 330,000 volunteers; some 3.5 per cent of the population.

Today's Army Reserve still owes a lot to one man: Richard Burdon Haldane. Haldane was a Scottish lawyer, Secretary of State for War in wake of the Boer War. He had three problems:

- The official report on a recent war was highly critical.
- **Continental inter-state conflict seemed imminent.**
- There was significant pressure to reduce military costs.

This may seem familiar to a modern audience. Haldane set about a series of radical reforms, intent on avoiding the necessity of national service. He wanted: "...really a National army, not separated by barriers of caste and class, but regarded by the people... as their very own."

So the Territorial Force (TF) was formed from yeomanry and volunteers with an establishment of 314,000. The TF was primarily for homeland defence, but Haldane (although he was frustrated in this) always intended that units should serve overseas in support of the Regular Army when needed. It is perhaps from this point that the modern use of the

Reserves as supplementary to the Regular Army starts. The Regular Army was not very grateful. Kitchener said: "...the Territorial soldier is nothing but a Saturday night soldier and a Playboy to boot... I will create a new army rather than rely on amateurs with a smattering of the wrong thing... Heavens above; I do not wish to employ a Town Clerk's Army in the pursuit of a professional's business."

Regeneration and Reconstitution

The definitions of regeneration and reconstitution (R&R) are neither authoritative, nor entirely satisfactory. It might be clearer simply to regard regeneration as restoring a force that has been degraded, and reconstitution as making the force bigger. However, the working definitions being used by Army Strategy Branch are:

Reconstitution is the expansion of force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, including the restoration of manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels.



It was not long before reconstitution was put to the test in World War One – the TF deployed long before Kitchener's new armies were ready. Field Marshal Sir John French (*pictured*) said: "Fathers and sons, husbands and brothers left families, homes, the work and business of their lives almost at an hour's notice to go on active service abroad... I sometimes wonder if the eyes of the country will ever be opened to what these Territorials have done."

I sometimes wonder if the eyes of the country will ever be opened to what these Territorials have done

318 TA battalions, 23 TA Divisions, 577,000 casualties and 71 VCs – that is what they did.

Regeneration is the timely activation, in full or part, of existing force structures and infrastructure, including the restoration of manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels.

In the 1998 Strategic Defence and Security Review the TA was reduced to 42,000. The new role was to augment the force for a large-scale direct intervention and it wasn't long before they got a chance to do it. In 2003 we invaded Iraq and approximately 25 per cent of the TA strength was deployed in the first year. During the campaigns in Iraq and southern Afghanistan:

- 27,000 army reservists were mobilised.
- **29 died on operations**⁴.
- At least four were awarded gallantry medals⁵.

So we have done this before. The question is, how could reserves be best used in R&R today?

⁴25 Army Reserves, 4 Regular Reserves.

⁵1 CGC, 3 MCs.

RESERVES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

Our reserves are currently divided into three categories; Volunteer Reserves, Regular Reserves and Sponsored Reserves.

Volunteer Reserve. The volunteer reserve comprises either generalists, people who train to acquire and maintain a good, basic and needed military skill by devoting about 40 training days a year to it, or specialists – those with civilian skills who deploy them in a military setting. Nestling within the generalists are a small select group of people of whom we can and do ask more; whether of availability or capability. The Army Reserve is growing to a total of 30,000 trained personnel and is organised primarily in unit structures. Today the Reserve is designed in order to support an enduring medium-scale operation, but changes in the Defence Planning Assumptions last year mean that it will now need to evolve to support the Army's primary task – fielding a warfighting division.

Following changes in the Defence Reform Act 2014, the Army Reserve can be called out for any purpose that a regular soldier would be used for, and technically for up to



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The Volunteer Reserve comprises either generalists or specialists – those with civilian skills who deploy them in a military setting. Specialists may be more expert at their role than some Regulars – experienced surgeons for instance – and indeed some capabilities can only be maintained by drawing on civilians in the Reserve

one year in every four.

Specialists may be more expert at their role than some regulars – experienced surgeons for instance – and indeed some capabilities can only be maintained by drawing on civilians in the reserve. But, in the majority of cases, Reservists are not trained in peacetime to the same individual or collective training standards as their regular counterparts. They need further training after mobilisation in order to take their place.

Volunteer Reserves are not as immediately available as Regulars. Some will be, and in fact a few commit to be available at higher readiness, but most people will need warning, time to get their lives in order and then time to mobilise. Individuals will of course be ready before formed units, which may require collective training before deployment.

Regular Reserve. The Regular Reserve is made up of ex-Regular personnel who, after leaving, are required to have a Reserve liability. The terms are complex, but broadly a soldier is liable for recall for 18 years from their date of discharge or until age 55. Today we have 9,000 officers and 21,000 soldiers in the Regular Reserve.

The July 2013 White Paper on the Future Reserves outlined how the Regular Reserve was to be used under Army 2020. It states that there is: “...an enduring requirement to retain the Regular Reserve as a distinct Reserve Force, for long-term national resilience and as the means to regenerate the standing forces for strategic scales of operation beyond our current planning assumptions.”

Regular Reservists do not of course train. A recent study suggested that it might be more appropriate to consider the Regular Reserve as a ‘previously trained pool of manpower’ as opposed to a ‘ready trained pool of experienced manpower’. Evidence suggested that skill fade is dramatic and members of the Regular Reserve would require significant retraining to regain currency, even after a relatively short period of absence. However, re-learning can be rapid, especially if the skills were learned to a high standard of performance initially. The availability of the Regular Reserve for mobilisation and their reliability is unclear. In the 12 months to 1 January 2016 only 40 per cent of officers and 25 per cent of soldiers responded to their annual reporting letter. This does not provide great reassurance that many of our 30,000 Regular Reservists would turn up if we needed them.

It is worth remembering that Regular Reservists are people who have decided to leave the Army for a range of reasons. While some may be highly motivated to return to serve, many almost certainly will not be. One Reservist who, much to his disgruntlement, was mobilised for a major exercise in the mid-80s, turned up smoking cannabis; well aware that his would have him instantly discharged again.

Incidentally, we don't yet have a reserve for those who have left our Volunteer Reserves. This must be considered.



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Citizen capability: A civilian movement specialist helps load a British Army Husky patrol vehicle onto a Royal Air Force C-17 at an airbase in the Middle East during Operation Herrick

Sponsored Reserve. Sponsored Reserves are civilians, employed by defence contractors, who are required to have a Reserve commitment as part of their employment. Mostly the employer provides a service linked to a particular equipment which is required in peacetime, but also if the equipment is deployed on an operation. The Army only has 50 Sponsored Reserves and these are employed as drivers for tank transporters.

Sponsored Reserves are exercising the same specialist skills at work or on military operations and are, therefore, fully trained. Similarly, by the nature of the roles that they are required for, a Sponsored Reservist is at a high level of readiness because he is required simply to continue doing the same job.

Provided the contractor has properly resourced the roles and the individuals are willing, theoretically 100 per cent reliability is assured. In practice some risk remains, particularly around individual motivation.

How useful are these components?

Considering the three components in reverse order:

Sponsored Reserves. By definition these are designed specifically to deliver particular capabilities to reconstitute or regenerate the force so, provided they are well-specified, this will be successful. However, they are not available for other tasks should the need arise.

Could more be done by creating more Sponsored Reserves, perhaps dormant in peacetime while they pursued civilian employment, but contracted to be available in war? For example, an entire transport regiment working for a haulage contractor could simply be redeployed to the military when needed. Apart from the normal issues with Sponsored Reserves, dormant contracts raise some new ones. How exactly does one price a dormant contract? What does the contractor do with his existing customers if the option is called? And how do we ensure availability? When dormant minibus hire contracts were used for UK home defence in the 1980s, it was suspected that some suppliers might have contracted out the same vehicles to the Army, police and ambulance services on the assumption they would probably not all need them at the same time. Of course the likelihood was that they would.

Regular Reserves. The Regular Reserve are the most obvious source of individual augmentees for the Regular force, but they may not be as useful as we have traditionally thought. Two issues need addressing: knowing where they are and their state of training. Potentially both issues could be addressed together, by incentivising some form of annual training weekend. However, the costs of this could be significant and the skills maintained would be at a very low level at best. Perhaps the best approach to Regular Reserves might be to persuade more of them to become Volunteer Reserves. The financial incentives that now apply have been successful in this, but it might be possible to go further – perhaps by having bespoke holding units for ex-Regulars. A possible plan in a time of rising tension might be to feed Regular Reserves back into

the volunteer reserve training pipeline at the appropriate point.

Volunteer Reserves. The Army Reserve has a number of advantages as a means of reconstitution and regeneration. Reservists are reasonably assured, available (albeit at longer readiness times), medically and physically fit, trained as soldiers and with a basic trade skill. They are flexible and can be retrained to suit the need of the moment. One Yeomanry unit in particular has been cavalry, armoured recce and gunners, but were quite content to be a signals regiment – for now.

The hidden benefit of the Volunteer Reserve is in the potential for further expansion. The training system is relatively quick and basic; mobilisation processes exist; there is a nationwide network of Reserve centres for recruiting and administration. Reservists are well connected in the civil society in which they work. In 1939 the TA was expanded from 200,000 to 400,000 between April and August. It is unlikely that we would ever want such an expansion of infantry again, but could not the same principles be used to massively increase the number of medical staff to combat a plague outbreak or IT experts to defeat major cyber-attack?

Volunteer Reserves are particularly suitable for UK resilience work: motivation, availability, employer and family support, plus local knowledge, will all be high. France has recognised this; already having most of its reservists allocated to homeland security, it has recently called for more patriots to join. We should acknowledge some weaknesses: concerns about motivation, limitation in training level and an officer and SNCO cohort perhaps more optimised to training than operations. And of course, to a point, it is voluntary. Will they turn up? The evidence suggests they will.

Factors

Thoughts are just being developed on how the Army's warfighting division is to be supported and how the roles of our Reserves might need to evolve. The following ten factors are likely to remain important:

- **Intensity.** The more complex and intense the operation, the more challenging it will be for Reservists to meet the demand. The environment – close battle or rear area – will be significant.

- **Readiness.** This is always going to be lower for Reserves, but the timescales are likely to be acceptable for reconstitution and regeneration.

- **Combat support spectrum.** In combat units engaged in armoured warfare it is perhaps more natural to think in terms of individuals joining a team and plan for sub-units or units in CS or CSS. However, such a simplistic assumption needs challenging: appropriate combat roles are likely to exist for formed units. Two indicators:

- In 2009 Normandy Company from 4 Mercian, commanded by its own company commander, successfully ran a forward operating base for four-and-a-half months.

- The Wessex Yeomanry is developing – with its paired sister unit – a programme for producing formed troops of

Challenger, using a combination of ex-Regulars and 'Lead First' officers.

- **Complex military skills.** If we want an R&R capability for trades such as aircrew then we are likely to have to invest in maintaining it. The Royal Navy do so and have found a way that minimises the cost. But we should not pretend that all military skills can be produced in the Reserves.

- **Civilian skills.** We have a growing number of specialists. Are there ways of further accelerating civilians into the military when needed? Also Reservists, who tend to be older, more mature and more empathetic with the civilian population, have actually proved more successful in security roles in a complex environment – Operation Tosca in Cyprus for example.

- **Training concepts.** We don't need to actually hold and train a skill; we just need a route to achieve it within the right timelines. For example, signallers with a good basic competence could be given intensive training on virtually any equipment before deployment.

- **Pairing.** Pairing improves inter-operability, enhances standards and improves mutual respect. It is likely to be a feature of organisational design.

- **Motivation.** How motivating is it to know your role in life is a battle casualty replacement? Reservists are no different to Regulars; where possible they want to serve with their mates. And it is particularly demoralising for officers and SNCOs to be separated from their soldiers. By mobilising and – where possible – deploying groups, this can be mitigated.

- **Officers and SNCOs.** Good officers and SNCOs are essential for the health of the Reserve and to deliver capability, but it is more challenging for them to meet Regular standards of operational training and experience, particularly at higher ranks. It is important that regimental officers have worthwhile operational roles.

- **Formed units.** Some regeneration may require individual reinforcements, but there is ample scope in reconstitution of the force for formed units or sub units to be employed, commanded by Reservists.

Conclusions

We have three types of Reserve, they all have utility in regeneration and reconstitution, but their characteristics differ. Volunteer Reserves present the greatest opportunity: not only are they the largest, most reliable and flexible component, but they also provide a good basis for further expansion.

The change in the Army's principal output to that of a war-fighting division will require changes to Regular force structures, and an evolution in the role of the Army Reserve. In the context of the last 100 years of volunteer military service, this can hardly be seen as unprecedented or revolutionary. However, we will be building on the sound foundations of Future Reserves 2020 and Army 2020, and looking forward keenly for any insights that historical analysis can afford us.

CONSTRUCTING CITIZEN FORCES: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

At the outset of any campaign or war, most of the best forces will be regular, for obvious reasons. This has led, however, to the lazy assumption that we can build a larger army by simply injecting reserve and civilian augmentees into that regular force. This paper offers historical evidence that leading and motivating successful citizen units is different from regulars and that the structure of peacetime reserves, and our plans for expansion, must reflect that to succeed.

There is justified concern about the collapse in the appetite of Parliament and people for land-based military adventures. A commitment not to put 'boots on the ground' is seen as necessary in any statement on military intervention. This is worrying – yet America has been here before.

Indeed, whereas our Service personnel, individually, still command the near universal respect of the public, after Vietnam, the American Armed Forces were despised and hated by an influential segment of the population. Many universities closed their Reserve Officers' Training Corps and uniforms were deeply unwelcome on most campuses. Yet, today, many observe the civilian-military links in America with envy. Before discussing this transformation, this paper argues three propositions:

First, that if we are seeking public support for a military mission at the point where it starts, we are already halfway to failure. Second that the essence of excellence among citizen soldiers is to train them together in a way that builds the links of comradeship, deploy them together and ensure that every process – from returning casualties to reinforcement – follows that. Third, linking those two, that effective, citizen-led Volunteer Reserves give the wider public a permanent stake in their armed forces in peacetime.

In the two world wars, it is widely accepted that the fighting spirit of the British Army in the First World War was superior to that of the majority of their sons in the Second. In the Great War, two-and-a-half million men volunteered. On the night before the Battle of the Somme opened, one million men, all volunteers, stood to. Not a single man was listed as AWOL and they did their duty with astonishing

bravery in the fiasco the next day.

In contrast, Rommel's early despatches on meeting our 8th Army, as he swept across North Africa, read like our own commanders' signals just months earlier, fighting the Italians. Indeed, Field Marshal Montgomery – a distinguished veteran himself of the Great War – felt it necessary to announce on the eve of El Alamein: "There have been far too many unwounded prisoners taken in this war. We must impress on our officers, NCOs and men that when they are cut off... they must... hold out where they are."

Why such a moral decline in a single generation? Some say that memories of the bloodbath of The Great War convinced a generation that war was a hopeless enterprise, others that the privations of the great recession shattered Britain's national cohesion. Yet Germany and Russia suffered more and there is evidence that the dominion forces were as good in World War Two as their fathers had been. Rommel's early, confident despatches transform when the Australian 9th Division stopped him in his tracks. They had no professional units and had only just arrived. Rommel commented: "The enemy fought with remarkable tenacity. Even the wounded went on defending themselves." Both they and the New Zealand Division went on to distinguish themselves again and again – taking more than twice the average British divisional casualties at El Alamein, for example.

Commentators, from American journalists to Stalin, highlighted the difference between the heroism of the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the performance of the British Army. Why was this? In the first half of the Great War, we had designed our forces around comradeship. The dominions did so in both wars. At the outset of the Great War, Britain had a Territorial Force (TF) of nearly a quarter of a million. It also had an ex-Regular Army Reserve of nearly 200,000



Kitchener had the vision to realise that this was going to be a long war, requiring a gigantic army. Unfortunately, he disparaged the Territorial Force as a 'Town Clerk's Army... who get their orders in Lord Mayor's parlours'



MONTY
FIELD MARSHAL
VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY
OF ALAMEIN
KG GCB DSO
1887 1976

There have been far too many unwounded prisoners taken in this war. We must impress on our officers, NCOs and men that when they are cut off... they must... hold out where they are



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In Vietnam, America trashed all these rules for optimising citizen forces... a mass injection of conscript civilian manpower, thrust in with no respect for geography, trained centrally, and with individuals deployed almost at random, made a toxic combination

plus. The TF was under-equipped and confusingly tasked only with home defence, but it was training regularly. Its first units were fighting within three months. As Sir John French put it: “Without the assistance which the Territorials afforded between October 1914 and June 1915, it would have been impossible to hold the line in France and Belgium.”

Kitchener had the vision to realise that this was going to be a long war, requiring a gigantic army. Unfortunately, he disparaged the TF as a “Town Clerk’s Army... who get their orders in Lord Mayor’s parlours” and set up an entirely separate structure of ‘Kitchener’ units, given priority in equipment but, with most of the Regular Army fighting or dead, with few people to train them. Fortunately, the Cabinet made Kitchener work on the recruiting of the New Armies with a newly-established Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. The mobilisation of the TF and the raising of extra divisions for them remained under control of the County Associations, forerunners of the current Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations (RFCA).

The Territorials provided more than two-fifths of the combat units deployed in action, almost always as formed units. Some of Kitchener’s new units were in Pals Battalions, bodies of men who had chosen to serve together, recruited geographically – sometimes even from a single employer. Other Kitchener units were also often raised by local dignitaries, with relatives and friends, who trained, laughed and partied together and deployed and died together.

In contrast, in the Second World War, excluding anti-aircraft units, the combat strength of the TA in 1939 was roughly half that in 1914. The qualitative difference even starker. There had been no money for training or equipment. Units who had managed an annual camp had often had their train tickets paid for by their officers. Suddenly realising we needed Reserves, the War Office compounded this sorry situation by ordering, in early 1939, each unit to double itself, without any indication as to how. Some literally split in half, others lost all their permanent staff. Then conscripts were poured

in, en masse. Out of this muddle came an army which was repeatedly beaten.

There were some shining exceptions. Other than Regulars, and carefully selected elite airborne and commando units, most were pre-war TA units that had somehow managed to train and retain cohesion.

The heroic stand of the 30th Motor Brigade at Calais included the Queen Victoria Rifles – the Green Jackets had retained the pairing between Regular and Reserve units, from the pre-Great War Army. The 4th Royal West Kents, in the desperate defence of Kohima, are another example.

Returning to the dominions, the 9th Australian Division were not wild men from the outback. Before the war, General Lesley Morshead worked for P&O, and unit commanding officers ranged from bankers to barristers and farmers. Their command structure were long-serving reservists who volunteered to build units, each from a specific locality, firmly welded into the tradition of the local reserve unit. Each unit trained together from conception, deployed together and care was taken to ensure that casualties, on recovering, were posted back into the same unit – an absolute contrast with much of the approach in the British Army.

Like Great War British units, their design was based around fostering comradeship and cohesion. This happens automatically in a regular unit which lives and trains together in peacetime. In the reserves, it requires a mixture of a much more marketing-led form of leadership – and systems in the wider army which prioritise building and keeping bodies of men together, even at the expense of short-term operational need and training standards.

In Vietnam, America trashed all these rules for optimising citizen forces. State governors lobbied the President to keep the Guard out of the war, on the basis that there was insufficient popular support to justify sending citizen soldiers. Instead of seeing this as a serious problem the Pentagon was



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The US Forces will never go to war again without units of the National Guard and Reserves. This gives the population equity in the fight, forcing political leaders to take account of popular opinion in decisions about war



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Localised lessons: Up-gunning Army training units to allow more training to be delivered regionally will strengthen the future effectiveness of Reserves on operations, according to the author

delighted to be able to brush aside the civilian political and social fabric which the regular generals saw as an irritating constraint. For the first and only time in American history they went to war without the militia. The forces deployed had a spine entirely of regular field officers. A mass injection of conscript civilian manpower, thrust in with no respect for geography, trained centrally, and with individuals deployed almost at random, made a toxic combination. Meanwhile, as the arguments about the war raged, the National Guard lobby, with its voice in every community in America, sat in angry silence.

Out of this disaster came the Abrams Doctrine, the foundation of the rebuilding of the relationship between the US armed forces and the people. The US Forces will never go to war again without units of the National Guard and Reserves. This gives the population equity in the fight, forcing political leaders to take account of popular opinion in decisions about war. In the First Gulf War, the highest-scoring armoured unit was the 4th US Marine Reserve Tank Battalion from Seattle.

In Afghanistan, the National Guard was given roles where it could be employed as formed units and sub-units. This contrasted to our TA which was used only as augmentees from 2008 (apart from hospitals), despite John Lorimer's plaudit for the company of the Londons under his command: "Somme company was an outstanding body of men; well-trained, highly motivated and exceptionally well-led."

The 2011 Houghton Commission commented that the 'augmentee-only' approach had been central to the withering of the TA officer corps. While the American active army shrank during operations in Afghanistan, the National Guard grew and reached full strength at 360-odd thousand. This was partly about their communities cheering them off to war, but underpinned, in peacetime, by the resilience work they do, hurricanes, floods, winter relief etc. – the clincher for popular support. They are the glue between America's regular military and civilian world.

Seven lessons

1) Start with a well-trained reserve, given opportunities to deploy under their own officers in formed bodies in peacetime. Formed platoon deployments on Operation Toral are good examples.

2) Rebuild the Regular Army Reserve.

3) Encourage the rebuilding of the reach, role and profile of the RFCAs.

4) Make plans with the RFCAs for building second- and third-line units, in case of maximum effort. Up-gun the Army training units so more can be delivered regionally. Ensure that soldiers do their basic training together and fight together.

5) Devise systems to ensure that casualties return to their original units.

6) Prepare reserve officers in peacetime for higher command, so on expansion we have a balanced mix of commanders. Build command teams and wider staff capacity for a much larger army than we can afford in peacetime, using modern technology and simulation.

7) Ensure that all with reservists under command put far more emphasis on listening, marketing and explanation than is necessary for a regular force. As George Washington's regular Prussian drillmaster put it in a letter: "You say to a soldier 'Do this' and he doeth it, but I am obliged to say 'this is the reason why you ought to do that...'"

This will generate units which fight well and command the regard and respect of their communities. If you have done all these things and the people are still not with you, then history – ours and others – suggests the enterprise is probably a mistake.

DIVISIONAL WARFIGHTING – THE IMPACT ON UK MOD’S DECISION-MAKING, ACQUISITION AND SUPPORT PROCESSES AND ACTIVITIES

The desire for the UK to return to a divisional warfighting capability will challenge many of the assumptions made since the end of the Cold War that have shaped the planning and execution of the Defence forward programme. Whilst both necessary and welcome (from a national perspective) this shift in emphasis will challenge the MoD’s existing Higher Level Operational Analysis (HLOA), the resulting allocation of funding within Defence, the current and previous efficiency programmes, and cause the Defence Equipment and Support and Information Systems and Services to review the primacy of competition as a procurement strategy in the acquisition and support of Land capabilities.

Operational Analysis (OA). The MoD forward programme is based on a set of HLOA and subordinate sets of analysis that have resulted in the selection of capabilities that reflect the ‘vision’ of all-pervasive ISTAR, enabled by high-capacity data networks and delivering precision strikes against a compliant opposition. This set of OA has been built up over the last 20 years and reflects both the impact of single Service politics and the inability of analytical tools to model the moral and conceptual aspects of conflict against an adaptive, technologically-advanced opponent. There is therefore a need to revise the current set of OA to reflect a hostile state’s ability to conduct operations across the full spectrum of hybrid warfare and to extrapolate these findings into the forward Defence programme. We should not underestimate the level of ‘friction’ that this will cause as the utility of large air platforms and air-delivered precision-strike against a competent opponent comes into question. The same work will also challenge the assumptions that we have

made about the ‘just-in-time’ delivery of stocks, the deletion of second and third lines of repair and the need to hold at high readiness stocks of (suppression) artillery munitions and counter-mobility capabilities. The Army needs to be mindful that there are a number of blue and purple turkeys that may not be wholly persuaded of the merits of Christmas.

The primacy of the strike capability. The Army will need to decide whether it is optimised for strike or divisional warfighting; whilst there is some overlap between the two activities, the four Ds (distance, demand, destination and duration) are likely to be sufficiently different to require different investment decisions. MoD politics will sustain the desire to ‘maintain strategic ambiguity’, but clarity will ultimately be required to provide adequate direction and prioritisation within the Command Acquisition and Support Plan and Information Systems Plan to allow delivery teams to let affordable and deliverable contracts. The sooner that the Army makes up its mind, the sooner it will be able to begin to resource a divisional warfighting capability.

Readiness. The time within which operational readiness must be achieved in theatre will be determined by revised departmental HLOA. The UK has attempted to achieve affordability of the forward programme through the employment of graduated readiness. This has allowed planning assumptions to be made about the ability to buy stocks within specified warning times, the ownership of platforms that are ‘fitted for but not with’ and assumptions about the employment of Reserves to ‘round out’ deployable units. All of these assumptions now need to be reviewed

Divisional deployment: Exercise Tractable, which took place earlier this year, tested the ability of 3rd (UK) Division’s lead armoured task force to deploy from barracks to air and sea points of embarkation. It witnessed the movement of more than 1,800 personnel and 1,200 vehicles



against the realistic timelines now required to deploy credible force elements to deter, for example, Russian aggression against the Baltic states. Apocryphal evidence indicates that a percentage of platforms that are held in storage are unfit, or have been cannibalised, and could not be made deployable within lengthy warning times. Analysis (and resource allocation) is therefore necessary to determine what work needs to be done to generate fit equipments to enable the training of a division; the equipment of units to enable divisional operations; and what proportion of stocks would need to be forward-deployed to reduce the time required to achieve readiness in theatre. The size of the Army and the nature of the threat may therefore dictate the end of graduated readiness and question the ability of Whole Fleet Management to deliver fully fit equipments in sufficient time to deploying units.

Training, rehearsal and deployment. The Army has not experienced deploying a division into the field in an adverse air and electro-magnetic environment and it is equally unsure about which of its current assumptions about mean time between failure and equipment availability are correct in a warfighting context. There is, therefore, a need to recommence the practice of regular planned and short-notice formation deployments that test the Army's ability to deploy to, operate, sustain and recover from unfamiliar locations. These deployments need to place both individuals and systems under stress by distancing units from peacetime locations for durations that test equipment and personnel resupply chains. Whilst much can be learned in CAST [Command and Staff Trainer] or on TEWT [Tactical Exercise Without Troops], experience indicates that we will learn best by doing.

Stocks. The UK's ability to deliver and sustain effective Force elements to operate against a competent opponent at higher readiness levels (almost certainly less than a week to match Russia's ability to conduct snap exercises on the borders of NATO nations) has been effectively removed in previous annual planning rounds both to meet savings and efficiency targets and to reduce the MoD's stock inventory. Whilst these cost-reduction exercises were valid in the context of previous departmental planning assumptions, they have resulted in the hollowing out or deletion of the Army's deployed capabilities. There is a need, therefore, to review the stockholdings required to deploy and sustain a credible divisional capability including our ability to outload stocks within the required timelines; the requirement to operate in an adverse electro-magnetic, long-range strike and air environment will almost certainly drive up the quantity of stocks that the UK will need to hold. Investment in improved storage and distribution infrastructure, transport and port facilities in the UK and in potential deployed locations will also be required.

Requirements. The Army will need to decide how much it needs to 'be different' in setting its capability requirements and how much it conforms to NATO or OCCAR standards so that it can draw stocks from host nation support or from common NATO stockpiles. The answer to achieving deployability within the timelines required to achieve a credible deterrent effect will rely, to a large extent, on reducing the need to deploy significant volumes of combat supplies, spares and repairables at the same time as the key force elements. Commonality of platforms and sub-systems with our principal NATO and European partners will be a key



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element of future requirement setting.

Acquisition and industrial strategy. The need to generate and sustain a credible warfighting division will end the employment of unconstrained competition as the default UK procurement strategy. It is noticeable that, unlike France, the UK has limited domestic ability to design and manufacture (for example) armoured vehicles, communication systems and night-vision equipments. Experience from the Ajax and Warrior Capability Sustainment programmes shows that, as happened within the submarine enterprise, it is not possible to switch armoured fighting vehicle production on and off and considerable support from non-UK personnel is required to regenerate on-shore industrial capacity. It is equally clear that tier two and three suppliers will not keep spare capacity (including skilled personnel) on-tap to provide unfunded surge capacity for the UK. The UK has attempted to have its cake and eat it and has, inevitably, been unsuccessful. Has the time come to re-grow the UK's domestic ability to manufacture and support Land capabilities, or to pay for partner nations to maintain additional spare capacity to support UK national needs?

So what? The near-term priority will be to make the most of what we already have by increasing equipment availability and through training and rehearsing to optimise the deterrent effect that we can generate against a competent Russian opponent. In the medium term we will need to adjust our equipment programme to achieve consistent tactical overmatch against a competent armoured opponent and to render their reconnaissance-strike capabilities far less effective through active and passive measures. Throughout the period we will need both to recreate the UK's sovereign capabilities in key Land systems areas and to be clear about where we will rely on other nations. Repeated competition to select the prime contractor for projects in the Land sector of UK defence industry has resulted in the collapse of domestic industrial capacity; the UK would do well to emulate the French.

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO STAFF OFFICERS

The discussion started almost by accident, not about reconstitution per se, but about how the Army might go about building legitimacy in order to provide the societal base from which to reconstitute a larger Army if required. Henry observed to Emma that he didn't see how, given the recent past in Afghanistan and Iraq and the economic constraints currently in play in the country (one can't even get financial approval to buy one more armoured vehicle, let alone a whole division's worth), it was ever going to be realistic to think the Army could achieve the recruitment necessary to man a second division or be allowed to spend the money on sufficient (and currently exquisite) kit to fight in a coalition context in a war on foreign soil with objectives which did not constitute the issue as an existential threat to the UK. Emma thought about it for a while and could only agree with the logic of the analysis put forward – in the context of a coalition war not seen as fighting an existential threat, given the apparent poor strategic outcomes of such ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, why would people want to join up or spend money wanted badly elsewhere in support of such a thing?

“But was that really what was being discussed on Thursday?”, she asked. “Was it not also the need to have plans on the shelf and consider mitigating actions which would be required now to enable real reconstitution of a potentially larger number of UK divisions in a total war situation of national survival?”

“No,” said Henry. “All that policy currently told the Army to do was to consider what he had described – and in any case it was just too inconceivable to consider, even primeval in its nature; national mobilisation was not on the table. And in addition, the current view of reconstitution was never going to be required in the first place even setting aside the unachievable nature of it – in terms of the scale of what was currently being discussed, the requirement for mass would have been met by contributions from other, say NATO, armies long before the situation could occur when the UK might be called upon to field a second division at full strength.”

Emma digested this analysis and thought about it for a minute, unable to disagree with Henry's logic but feeling that something still was missing. Then a worrying thought occurred to her. “Henry,” she said. “Although what you just said is almost certainly true, if you follow that line of analysis you end with the conclusion that the opposite scenario for reconstitution, however inconceivable it is and however we almost can't bear to think about it, of a requirement for national mobilisation, is actually the most likely to be required, isn't it?”

Think about the following scenario... Situation A: The situation in the Middle East deteriorates further with even more humanitarian atrocities and worries emerge about the conflict spreading closer to Western Europe's borders. There are calls for the West to 'do something'. It is discussed at the UN and in NATO, a 'peace-making force' is to be sent and initially there is determination not to make the mistakes of the past and send a sufficient force. These could include a substantial UK contribution, possibly even a full division, and for a while there is talk of dusting off the reconstitution plans to provide a second one if that might be required. The



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The situation in the Middle East deteriorates further with even more humanitarian atrocities and worries emerge about the conflict spreading

shadows of Iraq and Afghanistan are long, however, and politicians and the public in a number of countries remain unconvinced that it would be realistic or even desirable to attempt what could amount to 'regime change' and thinking changes; a force is sent but it is limited to 'peace-keeping' and preventing the worst atrocities.

Time goes by and things don't really improve. In fact they get worse and start to really spill over towards Western Europe. Again there are calls to act but the threat seems too vague and the strategic aims too unclear... very soon it is too late and the state descends into anarchy. Situation A is repeated – a small peace-keeping force is sent, arms and training are supplied to what is hoped to be the better party – but ultimately nothing effective is achieved. The 'rebels' are emboldened by the 'West's' lack of willingness to act decisively in Situation A in the Middle East. Those who want to act in the West are deterred and hampered by their inability to garner enough support in Situation A likewise and the situation rumbles on. However, by this time more NATO countries have committed ground troops to the two operational theatres and the conflict is now right on Western Europe's doorstep and starting to spill over into France, Germany and Italy. With the West thus distracted and its ground troops already committed in an ineffective war in the Middle East on its borders, a country in the East makes a sudden large-scale ground offensive into Poland.

The conclusions that Henry and Emma reached are that perhaps the reconstitution debate should be focused, not as it currently is on fielding a second UK division to fight in a coalition context in a war on foreign soil in a non-existential threat scenario, but on growing sufficient homeland defence capability (perhaps a Gendarmerie type force?) to protect the UK against the possibly growing terrorist threat (as in France) for the near term, and quietly focusing real reconstitution thought on how the country would generate a national mobilisation of the kind not seen since 1939 in the event that it was required, with all that this entails in terms of mitigating implications for force structure, seedcorn capabilities and the low-tech/exquisite-tech debate. Just a thought.

SERVICING THE FORCE


The British Army has long relied on contractors to support it on operations. Trains of artillery were originally pulled by ox teams engaged for the purpose, local transport resources were key to building and supporting the Empire and the military has always sought local sources of supply. This has continued for both the British and their allies in recent campaigns with the use of large numbers of locally-engaged staff in support roles, generally managed through Western prime contractors. Individuals have distinguished themselves in several campaigns, perhaps most notably James Langley Dalton, of the Commissariat and Transport department, who was awarded the Victoria Cross for his part in the defence of Rorke's Drift.

More recently, the Army has become used to the presence of industry in helping to deliver peacetime outputs. As the cost of Regular manpower has risen, the emphasis has been on an increasing 'teeth to tail' ratio for the force and as the skills necessary to sustain increasingly sophisticated equipment become more demanding to sustain, industry has taken a greater part in servicing the force. This increasingly whole force⁴ approach may also offer opportunities for resilience and reconstitution, whilst recognising that there are some things in which industry should probably not become directly involved.

So what does industry do today, and does this give a view on where it might contribute if there is a need to increase the scale of Defence effort? Broadly, there are three general areas. Firstly, there is the provision of tangible support services, which may include engineering support, supply and logistic functions, including the management of complex supply chains and facilities management – both hard (the facilities themselves) and soft (the services provided to those occupying them). Secondly, there are the more intangible support services, including back office services and consultancy and technical support. Finally, there is the role that industry now plays in delivering support to training, both delivering training at phases two and three but also technical support to collective training and specialist services such as provision of apprenticeship schemes.

The UK has a wide array of businesses that provide these services. Some original equipment manufacturers increasingly see the potential long-term benefit of support; there are firms that support Defence as part of a sub-set of their wider offering in, for instance, the construction or soft facilities management sectors, and there are specialist Defence support contractors of varying sizes. Similarly there are a whole range of contractual arrangements that may apply. But here is the first issue that may need addressing. Existing MoD contracts tend to be pared down to delivering against a specified set of output requirements and do not cover the requirement to support surge, except in limited, tightly-bounded circumstances. The MoD may need to consider whether this is appropriate if it has an increasing reliance on industry to support it at precisely the

⁴Effective, agile and resilient capability delivered by an integrated, pre-planned and affordable mix of regular and reserve military, civilian and industry resources as a first choice to meet Defence outputs (Defence Suppliers Forum endorsed joint MOD-Industry vision).



Further reading: The Army's relationship with industry was explored in detail in *Ares&Athena 2*, which is available for download at www.army.mod.uk/training_education/26398.aspx

moments when it is under stress. There may even be a good value-for-money case for this approach; anecdotal evidence suggests a premium is paid for CONDO [Contractors on Deployed Operations]-type services, especially in the early stages of an operation. There is a balance to be met here between cost and the likelihood of use.

Over the last decade the greater integration of industry into providing deployed Defence outputs has been codified under the banner of the Whole Force. This recognises that there is a range of suitable delivery models that suit both MoD and industry, from a total capability such as the Royal Fleet Auxiliary to more flexible use of technical experts from the Engineering and Logistic Staff Corps, or industry secondees into cyber or information operations organisations.

In 2014, and as part of the plan for persistent industrial engagement, the Army reviewed the principles under which a Whole Force might operate and these are listed below:

A Whole Force Approach solution is one that...

- Does not have a direct effect on the enemy
- Is not held at very high readiness
- Is required from roulement two onwards

- Industry has already proven it can deliver the required skill set(s)

- **Enables all or part of the force mix to be held at readiness until the point of requirement**

- Offers the potential to increase the efficient delivery of capability

- **Offers the potential to save cost**

- Can be clearly defined in output terms

- **Offers a genuine opportunity to implement a whole force blend**

- Can be used to fill an existing capability gap

- **Could be assured via an appropriate governance structure and relationship with the total support force delivery partner/service provider**

These principles probably remain valid today. The key is perhaps to understand that this is a set of principles and that not all of these need to apply in every case: there needs to be the flexibility to identify where it is that industry can provide support.


From an industry perspective it is also important to understand where value can really be added. At the time of the 2012 Reserves White Paper there was discussion of industry-sponsored Reserve units. Whilst recognising that the requirement for the Reserves has evolved since that time, this is unlikely to be the way in which most parts of industry can contribute most effectively, especially at a time of increased operational demand.

For industry to deliver efficiently, there needs to be a recognition that it cannot create capacity at short notice from thin air – it needs long-term volume of business to sustain capability. This may come from outside the Defence sector, but significant mass may only be available at times of genuine national emergency and cannot be created from nowhere.

Industry may, however, be able to sustain niche skills that are not viable in the Regular component. This is particularly the case with highly-specialised skills in engineering or logistic management, where the competence required cannot match the expectations of a service career structure.

At a time where some skills, especially in science, technology, engineering and maths, are at a premium, it may be that MoD and industry need to think in terms of an integrated manpower planning approach. What can be done in order to sustain the necessary skill sets and so ensure that they are available to Defence when required?

Are there opportunities to use evolving career structures as part of the New Employment Model to see greater cross fertilisation of staff between MoD and industry in order to develop and retain competence and currency? In this it may be appropriate to think of industry's contribution being optimised to address the things it can do best – some of which are contingent on the training and experience that are necessary in certain roles.



This can be considered diagrammatically as above. Where does each requirement sit on the multi-dimensional spectrum and where is it that industry can make the most effective contribution? At some point this analysis should then perhaps be tested for suitable value for money.

So, to conclude with a few insights as to how industry can best contribute to warfighting at scale:

- **Industry can be part of both the generating and generated force. The former may be particularly important in the reconstitution of the force, for instance in the training of recalled members of the Regular Reserve. Understanding the likely scale of this endeavour may be a useful tabletop planning exercise to meet the remit placed on the Army in Defence Strategic Direction.**

- Industry is most effective at delivering specific defined outputs. In particular, it can probably make the greatest contribution in delivering skills rather than mass. This may allow the Army to concentrate on the ability to deliver mass by other means, including greater use of the Reserves.

- **Industry will struggle to deliver at short notice what it does not routinely undertake. As with the Army, it cannot easily do on operations what it doesn't practise in peacetime. Where it is appropriate to do so, involvement of industry in planning and in some exercises gives confidence to both parties of the ability to deliver support where necessary.**

- But all of this is governed by the laws of physics. There remain constraints which cannot be easily overcome, including finite equipment, specialist facilities and, perhaps most importantly at a time of expansion of demand, the ability of the wider industrial supply chain to meet MoD's demands, especially if there is competition for scarce resources or sensitivities over sovereign capability.

CONCLUSION

The two workshops covered by this edition of *Ares & Athena* surveyed an enormous amount of ground and exposed a wide variety of perspectives and opinions regarding the developmental challenges the British Army faces in the next decade as it restores its readiness for war-fighting at scale. This edition comprises a selection of these views, but cannot claim to have captured their totality or indeed provided a recipe for success. However, it is possible to draw a number of broad conclusions as to the UK's initial approaches to the sequential challenges of 'regeneration' and 'reconstitution' driven by renewed potential for state-based threats to the UK.

- CGS's narrative articulating the utility of a UK division in the future operating environment is clear and is now reflected in Defence policy. This complements the expectations of key partners as to the desired UK land contribution to a major coalition effort.
- The task of regenerating a warfighting divisional capability by 2025, while not without risk, is broadly understood and affordable. The principal levers lie within the Army's authority, and hence responsibility and accountability for its delivery rightly rest with the Army.
- Wider regeneration of existing elements of the force structure to deliver greater depth is largely dependent upon the Army Reserve. Hence the on-going drive to expand, enhance and integrate the Reserves is timely and vital. Reinvigoration of the Regular Reserve to add latent depth could represent a potential quick win at limited cost.
- Greater and timely engagement with industry would offer not only assurance of supply of additional materiel, but also novel approaches to maintaining assured access to specialist manpower capabilities through Sponsored Reserves.
- By contrast, reconstituting new forces to deliver greater military capacity is fundamentally a strategic issue and hence

the responsibility of national government. Most of the levers sit outside the Army, and indeed outside Defence, so before the armed forces can do anything, government needs to set the demand and assure the economic, legal and societal means that would enable any large-scale expansion. Evidently this work is only just beginning.

- The fundamental role of the Reserves is again evident in providing a basis for expansion, at the same time as providing trained manpower to assure resilience and regeneration of Regular structures.
- Given the significant lead-times which industry would need to deliver additional complex equipment en masse, the greatest utility of reconstituted forces might be to backfill military homeland security tasks in order to release Regular and Reserve manpower to war-fighting roles for which they are better prepared.

Against a strategic context that is likely to continue to mix the demands of multiple dispersed threats of lesser intensity and possible increased threats from state-based actors, the UK government, Ministry of Defence and British Army must balance ends, ways and means in a way that addresses all threats and hence credibly assures national security. Work to re-establish national war-fighting capability at divisional level is well in hand, but providing viable mechanisms and plans for further regeneration and reconstitution must be next steps. It remains clear that confronting such a strategic challenge is a national issue, not one that Defence can address in isolation. It is encouraging, therefore, that the CHACR workshops revealed evidence that these challenges are now being confronted both within Defence and across wider government. However, there remains an onus on leaders to initiate a timely public debate as to what measures might be necessary in the advent of an unforeseen major crisis. It will be too late to do so on the edge of crisis, when time will not be on our side.





CHACR MISSION STATEMENT

To conduct and sponsor research and analysis into the enduring nature and changing character of conflict on land and to be the active hub for scholarship and debate within the Army in order to develop and sustain the Army's conceptual component of fighting power.