



# CHACR TAKE AWAY NEWSLETTER

ISSUE 10, MAY 23 - MAY 29, 2020

## INTRODUCTION

This is the weekly CHACR Take Away newsletter, which we will issue regularly from now on. In these newsletters, you will find links to the latest products by CHACR, but also links to key reports and studies by external experts and institutions which we think you should pay attention to. The aim is to continue advancing the mandate of CHACR to enhance the conceptual component of warfighting for British Army personnel. **The views expressed or studies shared in this document in no way represent the official views of the British Army, Ministry of Defence or any components thereof, but only that of its authors and are shared to stimulate thinking and discussions.**

## LATEST FROM THE CHACR

The CHACR's long term projects continue to develop well and we expect to have another two of the four books currently under development published this year. The latest **CHACR Take Away Interview [Lebanon with Lina Khatib](#)** covers the current economic & political conditions in the country, Hezbollah, the impact of regional dynamics (such as Syria and Iran) and what the UK can, or should do to help. Dr Meral's well received **CHACR Commentary [Where Academic and Military Dialogues Go Wrong and How to Correct It](#)** considers the challenges involved in forging effective Academic/Military relationships, and offers thoughts from his experiences as to how the challenges can be overcome to get the most from this relationship. Please remember that all of our **CHACR Take Away Interviews** and **CHACR Lectures on the Go** are available in audio format at [CHACR Podcasts](#) (which does work over MODNet). Keep checking our website and @Chacr\_Camberley on Twitter regularly for our upcoming releases!

## A WORD FROM THE DIRECTOR

I wonder how many of those who read the CHACR Newsletter have, over the last few days, received a flyer from *The Epoch Times*, or even know what it is? (The answer is a rather one-track, anti-Chinese Communist Party, right-wing publication; with global reach.) An *Epoch Times* special edition was delivered to me by my postman yesterday, as were, no doubt, copies of the publication to households locked-down all over the country. People with time on their hands will read it. This special edition, looking not unlike a very slim copy of the *Economist*, explained in some detail why China is to blame for all of our COVID woes. The opening editorial, for example, tells us that "A study from the University of Southampton suggests that China could have prevented 95 per cent of coronavirus infections if its measures to contain the outbreak had begun three weeks earlier". The whole publication continues in that vein, mixing fact seamlessly with assertion and speculation. Elsewhere, in print and in the ether, the voices that are pointing fingers at China are growing (some rabid and unhelpful, some serious and thought-provoking). The US President has, recently, changed his position from 'much respect' for President Xi to one of consistent innuendo and thinly-disguised digs at China's responsibilities in this respect. At the same time, those who closely watch strategic trends and indicators will have noticed a number of policy and doctrinal shifts, globally, that are worthy of a moment's thought: the US Marines, for example, have just reset their priorities to face China (have a look at this RUSI article: [US Marine Corps is Fixing Itself to Confronting China](#)). Those who take an interest in global strategic muscle movements would do well to keep a close eye on how the 'China Blame Game' develops. I suspect that, once nations have dealt with the immediate medical emergency, the post-COVID global recovery is going to need real statesman-like nuance, and the conversations that develop between China and other nations and global organisations will provide strategists with a range of useful pointers to consider.

**Maj Gen (Ret) Dr Andrew Sharpe**

## POST INF—RETHINKING NATO'S DETERRENCE STRATEGY

The Intermediate Range Forces (INF) Treaty was signed between the US and the USSR in 1987. The treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate and permanently forswear all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500km. The treaty was the first time the superpowers had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and conduct inspections for treaty compliance. However, it was not to last. In 2014, the United States stated that Russia was in violation of its INF Treaty obligations. Over the next four years, reports continued to claim that Russia was not adhering to its treaty obligations. In autumn 2018, President Donald Trump announced his intention to 'terminate' the INF Treaty, owing to Russian noncompliance with the terms of the agreement. The end of the INF treaty removes any outstanding legal barriers to the deployment of ground-based weapons systems and prompts serious questions about the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe, and the future application of ground-based tactical nuclear weapons. This is particular concern for the Baltic states, which are vulnerable to Russian aggression. This essay ([The Post INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO's Deterrence Strategy](#)) offers a bold solution for NATO to restore the strategic balance in the Baltics, deter Russian aggression and encourage Russia to reengage with arms control negotiations in the future.



Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan sign the INF Treaty. By White House Photographic Office - National Archives and Records Administration ARC Identifier 198588, courtesy Ronald Reagan Presidential Library: Source page: [www.reagan.utexas.edu](http://www.reagan.utexas.edu)

## C3 AND THE HONG KONG PROTESTS

The pro-democracy/anti-government protest movement in Hong Kong, while not a military operation, provides an indication of how civilian mobile phone technology can be a highly effective communications, command and control tool. Mobile phones were readily available essential equipment for the protest movement. The Hong Kong protesters relied on secure messaging systems, such as Telegram, and local Cantonese social media platforms to share information, organise action and generate ideas. Real-time updated local maps kept protestors informed of the location and status of actions on the ground. The Hong Kong protest movement illustrates the sophistication and ubiquity of civilian C3 technology. Access to advanced and effective communications technology is no longer limited to the military or police forces. This will affect how we plan and operate in urban areas in the future. We cannot simply expect to 'shut down' a communications network or platform as there are countless alternatives available to circumvent any shutdown. This article ([The Cove: C3 and the Hong Kong Protests - An Example of the Future in the Asia Pacific Region](#)) recommends how militaries can adapt and integrate civilian C3 into planning and training.

## EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN

The character of conflict is undeniably changing, but how much of this do we accurately understand? In this article ([MWI: Everything Old Is New Again: Flawed Thinking About the Future of War](#)), the British Army's own Paul Barnes argues that our interpretation of current operations is often formed from mythology and perceptions of historical experience, rather than empirical evidence. Culture, rather than evidence, often plays a role at the tactical, operational, and strategic level understanding of war. The 19<sup>th</sup> century enthusiasm for bayonet training, Soviet Deep Battle, Air Land Battle, and our contemporary shift from counterinsurgency to conventional warfighting, were all informed by deep military and societal cultural tendencies. While militaries often adhere to familiar concepts and doctrine, they are also smitten with the novel. There is a strong tendency to see present challenges as unique and unprecedented. Yet, concepts such as grey-zone conflict, cyber warfare, and proxy warfare, are classic tools of interstate rivalry and competition, repackaged for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF PME

How important is professional military education in the Army? Following a theme developed by our Dr Meral in his latest commentary, this article ([Small Wars Journal: Non-Technical Military Innovation in the Prussian General Staff and PME](#)) analyses the development, importance and impact of education in the Prussian Army in the 19th century. The author argues that lip service is being paid to continuous education in armed forces today, but that it has not become part of the military DNA. As the author says 'the pervasive sense of military organizational culture that shuns intellectualism in favour of action is very real today, just as it was more than 150 years ago. While leaders do arguably possess a much more robust set of critical thinking skills than did leaders from the nineteenth century, it cannot be overlooked that continuing education and self-development is of paramount benefit for both the individual and the military institution as a whole.' The article concentrates on the US armed forces, but it offers food for thought for every military.

## D-DAY: THE FUNNIES OF THE 79TH

Blogger, Think Defence takes a detailed look at the capabilities developed to deliver the Armoured Combat Engineer aspects of the D-Day landings. The [article](#) starts with a consideration of the problem, looks at some of the lessons the failed Dieppe raid taught the allies, delves into the complexity of the D-Day planning and then explores the ingenuity of the solutions developed to successfully field capabilities to overcome the Combat Engineering challenges the landings would face.

## THIS WEEK IN HISTORY

Between 31 May and 1 June 1916, the Battle of Jutland was fought between the Royal Navy and the German Kriegsmarine. It was the largest naval battle and the only full-scale clash of battleships in that war and also the last major battle in world history fought primarily by battleships. By moving their fleet into the North Sea, the Germans were trying to deal a blow to the Royal Navy in order to end the British naval blockade, which was beginning to strangle Germany and its population. Germany sent 99 ships to sea while the British mustered 151 vessels. The battle was a tactical success for Germany with Britain losing nearly twice as much of shipping tonnage as Germany. However, strategically, it did not achieve what the Germans had intended to achieve and the blockade was not broken.

## FRENCH DEFENCE INDUSTRY: POST COVID-19

The French defence industry is currently working on its next steps to overcome the effects of the COVID19 crisis ([defensenews: French Defense Industry Plays Catch up as Lockdown Partially Lifts](#)). In the recent months, the supply chain had been interrupted, most notably in the aeronautical sector because of its dual military-civilian role and the near-total halt in air traffic, which negatively affected imports. During the lockdown, defence industry leaders and the French procurement office DGA jointly set out priorities for programs and established what activities must be maintained to ensure the military continues its missions within France and in foreign theatres. The French ministry of defence is confident that the measures put in place have prepared the French defence industry for another wave of the virus should this occur.

## THINGS TO KEEP ON YOUR RADAR SCREENS

- **Constant Competition**

As the CHACR continues examining the concept of 'winning', this RUSI article on [Competitive Advantage and Rules in Persistent Competition](#) caught our attention

- **Integrated Review**

RUSI continues to provide an excellent tracking service for those who want to keep an eye on the [Integrated Review](#)

- **Syria**

Those who, despite distractions, are still keeping an eye on events in Syria should see this Aljazeera [article](#) on the internal affairs of the Assad regime.

- **Stealing Steel?**

In this [article](#) Elisabeth Braw explores the risks of the strategically important steel market, which is increasingly dominated by China

- **COVID 'Cure'**

The debate over the search for a 'COVID cure' continues to range from despairing negativity, to wildly unhelpful (inject disinfectant!) suggestions, to the optimistic and positive. This [article](#) provides an interesting insight.

- **A Greener World After COVID?**

Some hope after the ravages of COVID? [After the COVID 19 Crisis Will We Get a Greener World?](#)

## CHACR TEAM RECOMMENDS

### Thomas Rid, *Active Measures*.

Active Measures is the story of modern disinformation campaigns, beginning in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and carrying on through the Cold War to today. Thomas Rid draws upon intelligence materials from numerous countries and interviews with former and current operatives to uncover accounts of Soviet, latterly Russian, and American disinformation campaigns—some successful, others less so. Active Measures reveals the stories of a Bolshevik attempt to foil White Russian influence abroad; a KGB-sponsored anti-Semitic hate campaign; efforts to inflame racial tensions through fake Ku Klux Klan postings and attempts to paint AIDS as an American biological weapons experiment. The book offers fresh insight on the 2016 American Presidential election, particularly the role of the infamous ‘troll farm’ allegedly operating from a St. Petersburg office block. It sheds light on a fascinating part of Russian-American relations, helps readers understand Soviet and Russian perspectives on the use of active measures, and offers suggestions of how we might see through contemporary deception.

You can watch John Sipher’s presentation on this topic [here](#)

### Adam Kay, *This is Going to Hurt*

Billed as ‘The Secret Diaries of a Junior Doctor’ Adam Kay’s book gives an extraordinarily frank and revealing insight into his progress as a doctor over six years in NHS hospitals. His collection of short vignettes makes easy and compelling reading, sometimes hilarious, sometimes horrendous, sometimes very moving indeed. He mixes humour, pathos and bathos brilliantly, alongside a clear sense of frustration and irritation on behalf of all NHS staff. At this time when the focus is very much on the NHS under immense extra strain, it is well worth reading this book, not only because it is a quick, entertaining and easy read, but also because it gives one a very good idea of what it’s like to work in the NHS when they are *not* under more than the usual pressure, and thus a good idea of what life must be like for junior doctors right now.

### Jörg Muth, *Command Culture*

In *Command Culture*, Jörg Muth examines the different paths the United States Army and the German Armed Forces travelled to select, educate, and promote their officers in the crucial time before World War II. The book explores the paradox that in Germany officers came from a closed authoritarian society but received an extremely open minded military education, whereas their counterparts in the United States came from one of the most democratic societies but received an outdated military education that harnessed their minds and limited their initiative. This book should be read by everybody who has got an interest in professional military education in the Army and the consequences of this education on the field of battle.

## BAR PICK

In this edition of the CHACR newsletter we are dipping back to Dr Jonathon Boff’s article in [BAR 174](#) ‘Culture Clash: British and German Military Innovation at War 1914-1918’. This piece touches on some of the issues raised in our recent Commentary on Military-Academic interaction. In particular, it highlights the importance of working with the ‘institutional grain’ to optimize adaptability. As Jonathan points out, although the ability to integrate innovative ideas was not always flawless, this was a relative British strength during the First World War. Academic and civilian expertise often gave the British Army the advantage over its adversaries which it used to achieve final victory in 1918. Given that Jonathan, along with Professor Sir Hew Strachan, contributed to our in-house journal one hundred years later, suggests that where academic quality exists, many military ears will listen. We can all improve our ability to seek out and use knowledge to overcome our contemporary challenges, but we should not overstate the problem.

---

## ABOUT THE CHACR

You can learn more about the CHACR at [www.chacr.org.uk](http://www.chacr.org.uk)

This document can not be republished, cited in part or full, distributed or posted in any forum or media without permission from the CHACR.

**CHACR is an independent think-tank established by the British Army. The views expressed in the content of this newsletter and studies and reports it signposts are those of individual authors and in no way represent the official views of the British Army, Ministry of Defence or any components thereof. They are shared to stimulate thinking and discussion, and exposure to different views.**