



# CHACR TAKE AWAY NEWSLETTER

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## INTRODUCTION

This is the weekly CHACR Take Away newsletter, which we will issue regularly from now on. In these newsletters, you will find links to the latest products by the CHACR, but also links to key reports and studies by external experts and institutions which we think you should pay attention to. The aim is to continue advancing the mandate of CHACR to enhance the conceptual component of warfighting for the British Army personnel. **The views expressed or studies shared in this document in no way represent the official views of the British Army, Ministry of Defence or any components thereof, but only that of its authors and are shared to stimulate thinking and discussions.**

## LATEST FROM THE CHACR

While we continue with our long term book projects and support specific Army tasks, we are also increasing our regular public output to provide you with analysis and insight on issues of relevance for the Army. Last week we released a [new CHACR Take Away video interview on the surge of attacks by ISIS in Iraq and Syria](#) with a leading expert on the organisation and Syria, Hassan Hassan. Later this week we are recording a new one with Shashank Joshi of the Economist on COVID-19 and defence globally. Our latest **CHACR Lectures on the Go** was delivered by Prof James Ker-Lindsay, giving a background brief to British engagement with and presence in Cyprus. We have recorded two new lectures with our own Dr Strohn, one which explores the concept of winning a war, and another one on the legacy of the WWII, focusing on the German experience. The first one [was released this week](#) on our website! Dr Strohn also [wrote a new piece](#) for **CHACR Commentary** page on why the WWII still matters today. Keep checking @CHACR\_Camberley on Twitter, and our website [www.chacr.org.uk](http://www.chacr.org.uk).

## A WORD FROM THE DIRECTOR

This week I have been mulling thoughts about nationhood and common purpose. History is full of examples of nations finding their identity in the face of bonds forged in hardship. The late great Richard Holmes used to deliver a wonderful vignette on Canadian nationhood on staff rides in Flanders and Normandy, illustrating how the two world wars had given Canada the confidence to speak, and act, for itself; and any dawn attendee at a modern ANZAC Day in amongst Australians will hear an extraordinary narrative of Gallipoli, delivered a hundred years or more on, explaining Australian identity forged in the face of insurmountable odds. Much of the rhetoric as we tackle COVID has been war-like: 'a fight', 'the battle against this disease', 'if we are to defeat this deadly virus', et al. But I wonder if the same war-like sense of unity, of nationhood, of common response to a common threat, or of togetherness is as evident as the language may suggest. Beyond showing, together, our appreciation for the NHS and other key workers, is COVID pulling us together in the face of a common threat? Our politics, our media, our modern approach to life do not lend themselves to positive unity of purpose. The twenty-first century has, perhaps, made us quite individually-focused, but it has also encouraged us to become very critical, very questioning, very sceptical - all of which are good qualities for forensic examination, but few of which are bonding qualities. History, those who study strategy, and, indeed the shelves of the business section of any bookshop, will tell you that unity and common purpose are the benchmarks of successful attempts to tackle adversity. **Maj Gen (Ret) Dr Andrew Sharpe**

## WATCH THE LATEST LECTURE




## ISIS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

If you have watched [the latest CHACR Take Away video which focused on ISIS](#), you would be aware of the worrying trend, and the need to pay attention to the topic. [This recent piece by Hassan Hassan](#) provides a detailed background to our discussion with him. Among some of the important observations is the point that “ISIS has demonstrated that, despite sustained military pressure against it and despite upheavals like the death of its leader and the collapse of its caliphate, it can preserve its internal structures and communicate with its various sectors and foreign affiliates, without a single case of partition or fracture.” In some good news, Iraq finally has a new Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who is facing mighty challenges from ISIS to protests and the economy facing severe risks due to the oil prices. [This briefing by MEI experts](#) is a good back-grounder on what is next for him as he faces these challenges.

## JIHADIST GROUPS IN SAHEL

The SAHEL region is witnessing activities of both ISIS and Al-Qaida related groups, and at times their clashes with each other. Recent events challenge the analysis from earlier this year that the two networks were drawing closer. Click on the picture below to read the BBC Monitoring briefing on the latest developments:



## COERCION THEORY

Coercion theory seeks to explain the logic behind threats, violence national security decision-making. It encompasses both *deterrence* and *compellence*. Coercion theory reached its zenith in the mid-1960s at the height of the Cold War and is one of the most robustly studied theories in modern social science. Military leaders need to have a solid understanding of coercion theory to be effective strategists. [This article clarifies the language of coercion theory and explains](#) how it can be helpful in the development and analysis of strategic thinking.

## ARCTIC WARFARE

Future planning for arctic operations envisage scenarios in which the naval and air domains dominate. This is not surprising, as the Arctic Ocean is the region's defining geographic feature, and if climate change persists, it will be navigable for the first time. Even with navigable sea lanes, the Arctic is vast and isolated, making the air domain indispensable. Should the Arctic become a future theatre of conflict, what does this mean for the land domain? [This article draws on the Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive of 1944, the largest land operation ever conducted entirely above the Arctic Circle, to illustrate the enormous challenges posed by the Arctic climate.](#) The Soviet Army had enormous difficulty sustaining a large force in the Arctic, not because of the superiority of German and Finnish Forces, but because of the climatic conditions and topography. Primitive road networks were disrupted by heaving permafrost, stymying the transportation of troops and heavy equipment. Freezing temperatures sapped morale and led to non-freezing cold injuries. These challenges will increase in future scenarios, as climate change will increase the flow of Arctic Rivers, accelerate the melting of permafrost, whilst cold and wet weather will persist. The 1944 experience offers pertinent lessons for future planning.

## CYBER WARFARE

What differentiates cyber warfare from cyber terrorism? Where do we draw the line between terrorism and warfare in this new domain? This article seeks to clarify the two terms, by looking at US and Russian doctrine. American and Russian doctrines differ considerably in their definitions of cyber activities. US doctrine treats cyber capability, both offensive and defensive, within an effects-based approach. Therefore, cyber capability is considered an employable asset, to be used against an adversary to achieve a desired effect. Russia, however, does not use the term 'cyber.' Instead, it views activities in the cyber domain as part of the wider realm of information warfare. Cyber activities are not conducted to achieve a specific effect, but as part of a wider effort to maintain information dominance. [The article argues](#) that, given the lack of clarity and uniformity in definition and application, there are only cyber *incidents*, that cannot clearly be defined as acts of 'warfare' or 'terrorism.'

## BATTLE OF ARNHEM

Operation Market Garden, or to be more precise, the British fight at Arnhem, in 1944 remains one of the key moments in British commemoration of the Second World War. The battle has been studied in depth and many units and formations have conducted battlefield studies to learn about this fight in the Netherlands in September 1944. The events are well known and so are the reasons why the operation failed. And yet, there remain question marks over the operation: Why was it conducted when the Allies knew about the German presence in the area? Was the failure essentially the fault of the Air Force for having chosen the wrong landing zones - zones that were too far away from the bridge at Arnhem? This is usually taken as one of the main explanations for the British disaster at Arnhem. And it is a convincing one... as long as one does not consult the German sources. These tell a very different picture. According to the after action report from 116 SS Bn, the first unit to engage the British, the landing zones had been chosen perfectly, but the British made some tactical errors on the ground, which prevented them from reaching the bridge with a strong enough force to seize and hold it. Read this brilliant [report that provides some great insights](#).

## MONTGOMERY

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery remains one of the outstanding military leaders in British history. And yet, relatively little seems to be known in the Army about him and his years prior to events such as the battle of El Alamein or Operation Market Garden. What do we actually know about his background and his development in the Army – and how was he seen by his peers? What were his strengths and weaknesses as a soldier and a human being? Professor Lloyd Clark [answers in this lecture](#). Watch on non-ModNet computers.

## THINGS TO KEEP ON YOUR RADAR SCREENS

- **Kabul Attack**

[A monstrous attack on a maternity ward in Kabul this week](#). No group claimed responsibility yet.

- **Military Primacy and China**

[A thought provoking article](#) on the question of American military primacy in response to China

- **US Ends CBP**

[US ends its Continuous Bomber Presence](#) which operated for last 16 years, read as a sign of waning US interest on Western Pacific.

- **EU Defence Budge**

Last three years saw unprecedented EU engagement and investment in shared defence. [Economic conditions now puts it all at risk](#).

- **Terrorism and Mass Media**

[New briefing by RUSI](#) on how the media reporting might amplify effect of terrorism.

- **Defence Technology**

[A major new report by NATO](#) on how defence technology trends next 20 years will impact security.

## THIS WEEK IN HISTORY

The Indian Mutiny of 1857 was a major, but ultimately unsuccessful, uprising in India in 1857–58 against the rule of the British East India Company, which functioned as a sovereign power on behalf of the British Crown. The rebellion began on 10 May 1857 in the form of a mutiny of sepoys of the Company's army in the garrison town of Meerut, 40 mi (64 km) northeast of Delhi (now Old Delhi). It then erupted into other mutinies and civilian rebellions chiefly in the upper Gangetic plain and central India, although incidents of revolt also occurred farther north and east. The mutiny posed a considerable threat to British power in that region, and was contained only with the rebels' defeat in Gwalior on 20 June 1858. On 1 November 1858, the British granted amnesty to all rebels not involved in murder, although they did not declare the hostilities to have formally ended until 8 July 1859. The rebellion saw the end of the East India Company's rule in India. In August 1858, by the Government of India Act, the company was formally dissolved and its ruling powers over India were transferred to the British Crown. The rebellion transformed both the native and European armies of British India. Of the 74 regular Bengal Native Infantry regiments in existence at the beginning of 1857, only twelve escaped mutiny or disbandment. The old Bengal Army almost completely vanished from the order of battle. These troops were replaced by new units recruited from castes hitherto under-utilised by the British and from the minority so-called "Martial Races", such as the Sikhs and the Gurkhas. The British increased the ratio of British to Indian soldiers within India. The post-rebellion changes formed the basis of the military organisation of British India until the early 20th century.

## CHACR TEAM RECOMMENDS

### George MacDonald Fraser. *Flashman in the Great Game*

The Flashman novels probably do not require an introduction to a British Army audience. *Flashman in the Great Game*, the fifth novel of the series, begins with Flashman at Balmoral as a guest of Queen Victoria. Here he meets with Lord Palmerston, who recruits him to go to Jhansi in India and investigate rumours of an upcoming rebellion among the Sepoys. Flashman skulks through India in various disguises, narrowly avoiding death several times and witnessing first-hand the carnage of the Sepoy Mutiny. *Flashman in the Great Game* covers the years 1856 to 1858 and offers, in typical Flashman style, not only a good and entertaining read, but also light-hearted context to historical fact and insight.

### Philip Coggan. *More: The 10 000 Year Rise of the World Economy*

*More* is an ambitious undertaking: tracing 10000 years of the development of the world economy in less than 500 pages. The book begins with the obsidian blade trade in the ancient Middle East 7000 years BC and end is with the present day Chinese-American trade rivalry. The book discusses pivotal developments in agriculture – stirrups and harness for horses, edible and hardy crops that could withstand cold winters and long journeys. *More* illustrates the complexities of historical economies – networks of credit and borrowing similar to our own, influenced by political events and powerful trade guilds, and also explains why these societies largely remained poor. The book shows the revolutionary impact of the internal combustion engine on industrialisation and international trade, albeit at a devastating environmental cost. It also highlights the importance of the development of the modern state structure to the functioning of economies, the accumulation of wealth and greater prosperity. A financial journalist with over two decades of experience at the Financial Times and the Economist, Coggan's deft writing skills and illustrative anecdotes make this book highly informative and accessible to the non-economists amongst us.

### *The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot (in two volumes)*

If you are interested in the Napoleonic wars then perhaps the fullest, and most readable, contemporary account can be found in the memoirs of the French light cavalryman, Lt Gen Baron de Marbot. Amazon can provide you with a range of choices for English translations, or, if you prefer, the original French version, of this comprehensive work. Marbot takes us from his naive school days, to joining up as a light cavalry trooper, and through every major engagement of the Napoleonic wars - Austerlitz, Jena, Aspern, Wagram, Portugal and Spain, Russia, Leipzig, et al, - finally finishing up commanding the 7th Hussars on the extreme right wing of the French Army at Waterloo, and being the first to realise that it was the Prussian army, rather than help, that was arriving from the East. This book is a wonderful insight into both the great events of those wars, and the mind of a French Napoleonic soldier.

## BAR PICK

The British Army Review (BAR) is now publicly available and can easily be [accessed on the Army's public platform](#). CHACR takes pride in its support to the continual development of BAR. In our Newsletters, we will draw attention to interesting and noteworthy articles, and point to their page numbers, which you can read by clicking on the cover of the issue they are in in this section. In the current issue, we recommend the essay by **Col Will Davies**, "**Competition in the Periphery**" (pages 7-13), which is an important trend in the current phase of international relations, where regional and international actors use proxies, diplomacy, coercion and subthreshold aggression against other states in periphery theatres that sees conflict, wars and weak governance.



## ABOUT THE CHACR

You can learn more about the CHACR at [www.chacr.org.uk](http://www.chacr.org.uk)

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