



‘ALWAYS
READY,
ALWAYS
CLOSE’



DWOT

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MASS MULTIPLIER: POLAND'S TERRITORIAL DEFENCE FORCES

POLAND has been conducting a massive military modernisation programme in the face of the Russian threat that has grown dramatically since the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This programme has demonstrated a strong qualitative aspect in acquiring new up-to-date equipment in an ambitious effort at capability enhancement. Technical modernisation has been matched by an important quantitative element as illustrated by the dramatic enlargement of its force structure in terms of serving personnel. Thus, quality has been paralleled by quantity as the Polish armed forces seek to increase combat mass. There is also a high/low aspect to the development of the force structure. The creation of the Polish Territorial Defence Forces – *Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej*

(WOT) – represents an effort to increase Polish land forces mass at the low end of the military spectrum in terms of cost and capability. The WOT, however, does not simply exist to enhance Polish defence on a modest budget.

Like other territorial defence forces, the WOT is meant to serve as a component of a system of 'armed national defence against foreign attack'.¹ What does this mean in practice and what are the generic characteristics of a territorial defence force? Horst Mendershausen stressed in an early 1980 RAND study that territorial defence forces have four chief characteristics: they are forces for local defence, they are "latent rather than standing forces", their capabilities are geared to their defensive role, and they are national forces linked to broader society and local communities. Moreover,

territorial defence forces often sit within a 'comprehensive or total' defence system that aims to mobilise and harness the resources of the entire society.² During wartime, however, territorial defence forces are subordinated to regular operational forces. Taking into consideration these broad features, this *In-Depth Briefing* aims to examine the development of the WOT since 2016 within the Polish national security system and its characteristics as a branch of the Polish armed forces.

WOT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

The WOT officially came into

¹Adam Roberts, *Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence*, (Chatto and Windus for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 15.

²Horst Mendershausen, 'Reflections on Territorial Defence', *A Rand Note N-1265-AF*, January 1980, pp. 2-3.

being in law on 16 November 2016.³ The legislation was later incorporated into a comprehensive national defence law entitled ‘o obronie Ojczyzny’ (About the Defence of the Homeland) and promulgated in 2022.⁴ The ‘Defence of the Homeland’ provides “the legal basis for non-military national defence preparations” and defines “the special role of Territorial Defence Forces”.⁵ In this national security legislation, WOT sits at a kind of junction between the armed forces, public bodies and civil society in the Polish national security system.

Because of its position in Poland’s

³*Dziennik Ustaw, Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2016 r. o zmianie ustawy o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz niektórych innych ustaw, Poz. 2138.*

⁴*Dziennik Ustaw, Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2022 r. o obronie Ojczyzny, Poz. 655, 974, 1725.*

⁵*Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. The Concept of Defence of the Republic of Poland, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Maj 2017, p. 56.*

⁶*Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Territorial Defence Forces, Main Tasks, gov.pl/web/national-defence/territorial-defence-forces. Accessed 9 October 2025.*

⁷*Testimony by General Wiesław Kukuła, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, X kadencja, Zapis Stenograficzny z posiedzenia Komisji Obrony Narodowej (14.), 8 września 2021 r., Warszawa 2021 r., p. 6.*

⁸*Dziennik Ustaw, Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2022 r. o obronie Ojczyzny, Poz. 655, 974, 1725.*

⁹*Jakub Borowski, ‘Szef MON: WOT podporządkowane Sztabowi Generalnemu w tym roku’, Defence 24, 4 April 2024, defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/szef-mon-wot-podporzadkowane-sztabowi-generalnemu-w-tym-roku. Accessed 4 April 2024 and Jakub Borowski, ‘MON: w czerwcu certyfikacja WOT, w sierpniu przejście podrozkaży szefa SGWP’, Defence 24, 24 April 2024, defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/mon-w-czerwcu-certyfikacja-wot-w-sierpniu-przejscie-podrozkazy-szefa-sgwp. Accessed 25 April 2024.*

¹⁰*Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Dowództwo Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej, DWOT 1/2018, Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej w operacji – DD-3.40, Warszawa: 2018. This doctrine publication utilized in a number of Polish dissertations and articles, but does not appear to be in the public domain.*

national security system, the WOT is assigned a variety of military and non-military tasks. The Polish Ministry of Defence (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (MON)) has published a list of headline WOT tasks on its website. While not exhaustive, it identifies the WOT’s core activities:

- presenting deterrence posture;
- conducting military operations within the Strategic Defence Operation, in order to repel enemy aggression;
- coordinating and executing crisis management activities with other parts of the national security system, i.e. Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence agencies, in order to protect and support local communities;
- providing and coordinating host nation support, in order to enable efficient reception and staging of Alliance elements in Poland;
- conducting counter hybrid and asymmetric warfare;
- promoting among the Polish society patriotic values and education.⁶

Thus WOT’s activity resides in a combination of single and multiple spheres. WOT’s role in deterrence and military operations against aggression take place centrally within the military sphere. In contrast, crisis management activities and protection and support of local communities largely reside in the sphere of working with public bodies. In a similar vein, promotion of patriotic values and education focuses on the sphere of civil society, particularly given that WOT is located throughout the country and is a visible presence in local communities. Providing host

nation support for Alliance elements involves the spheres of both the armed forces and public bodies, bringing together force protection and civil-military coordination. The one task where WOT has a simultaneous role in all three spheres is in countering hybrid and asymmetric threats. These threats have a ubiquitous presence in both the military and civil arenas and can be found at the sub-threshold level of conflict and during armed conflict. Therefore, the WOT’s role makes it a conventional military force, a contributor to national resilience and an influencer on national security within Polish society.


In testimony before the Polish Senate Committee of National Defence in 2021, General Wiesław Kukuła, the then commander of the WOT, stated that “territorial military service should not be understood as a form of so-called reserve service; it is a form of active service”.⁷ The WOT is meant to be a rapidly mobilised local force giving it an ongoing availability characteristic of standing forces while being constituted in majority by reservists. Its local responsiveness is central to its core roles of contributing to national resilience and warfighting capacity. It is the intention in this *In-Depth Briefing*, however, to concentrate on the WOT’s warfighting role.

CHARACTERISTICS

The WOT is designated as a branch of the armed forces alongside the land forces, the air force, navy and special forces.⁸ The headquarters of WOT (Dowództwo Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej (DWOT)) at Zegrze, just northeast of Warsaw, is responsible for command and coordination in crisis situations, operating locally and at a national level for the training and development of WOT. Its branch status conferred considerable autonomy in the first eight years of its existence.

This has given WOT scope in setting its own requirements without competing with land component priorities for resources, thus allowing a latitude of freedom in its conceptual development. This initial freedom was underpinned by the direct subordination of WOT to the Minister of National Defence until it achieved full operational capability. In 2024, command and control of the WOT branch formally shifted to the Polish Chief of the General Staff.⁹

The work in establishing WOT began in 2017, but it was not until 2018 that WOT acquired its first doctrine. *Territorial Defence Forces in Operations (Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej w operacji, DD-3.40)* described its conceptual underpinnings and organisation.¹⁰ Fundamentally, the WOT was conceived as a force that would principally operate at both the local and regional level, although employment outside its designated locality was not ruled out. The WOT force structure consists of brigades, battalions



DWOT

and companies, with each assigned to a 'specified region of responsibility' (stałych rejonach odpowiedzialności (SRO)). The SROs relate to the administrative structure of Poland.

This grounding of the WOT in its local area and community is exemplified by its motto 'always ready, always close' (Zawsze gotowi, zawsze blisko).

FORCE STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITIES

The initial force structure design of WOT envisaged the raising of 17 territorial defence brigades (brygada obrony terytorialnej (BOT)), with one based in each of the 16 województwa (provinces) with the exception of the largest – mazowieckie, which would have two brigades. The establishment of these brigades was planned to take place in four stages between 2016 and 2019. It was to be a rolling programme with brigades established in the eastern most województwa first and then progressing westwards.

While the process of raising the 17 WOT brigades was well underway, the Polish government in 2023-2024 took the decision to create three additional brigades: one for Poland's capital city and two additional brigades in provinces on Poland's eastern border.¹¹ This change gave the WOT a 20-brigade force structure.

These additional brigades were the prelude to a diversification of WOT brigade types defined by operational requirements. The standard WOT brigade consists of three to five light infantry battalions, a command company, a logistic company, a support company, an engineer company and a medical platoon.¹² The number of light infantry battalions in a WOT brigade can vary, with three battalions a nominal number depending on the stage of development of the brigade and the requirements of



the assigned SRO. The addition of three brigades led to a second type of brigade organisation for the WOT. With the WOT training cycle being seriously disrupted by the COVID crisis and the need to strengthen eastern border security due to illegal migration, the decision was taken by the Polish government to create within the WOT a 'Border Defence Component' (Komponent Obrony Pogranicza (KOP)) of four border defence brigades. These brigades would be optimised for a border defence and security mission to allow training in the other 16 brigades to proceed with less disruption and more consistency. The four border defence brigades are the 1st Podlaska, 4th Warmińsko-Mazurska, 19th Nadbużańska and 20th Przemyska. All of these brigades reside in provinces adjacent to Poland's eastern frontier. The internal organisational structure of these brigades differs from the standard WOT brigade in the composition of its cadre. The WOT is built on a core of regular professional soldiers who provide command, staff and specialist roles. The professional soldier element constitutes about 16 per cent of the total territorial defence force, with the remainder being soldiers

in territorial service.¹³ In contrast, full-time professional soldiers form the majority of the border defence brigade cadre. Brigadier General Krzysztof Stańczyk, the Commander of the WOT, in testimony to the Sejm National Defence Committee in Spring 2024, indicated that the level of professional soldiers would be 50 per cent.¹⁴ In an interview he gave to the Defence 24 news organisation later in 2024, Stańczyk updated the percentages indicating that 70 per cent would be professional soldiers and 30 per cent soldiers in territorial service.¹⁵ Whatever the eventual percentage, this is a significant change in cadre structure for the four border defence brigades.

The WOT is configured and armed as light infantry. Its most basic tactical organisation is the light infantry section, which is dubbed the 'Magnificent Twelve' (Wspaniała Dwunastka)¹⁶ and outlined below:

1. Dowódca sekcji
Section commander
2. Zastępca
Deputy section commander
3. Starszy radiotelefonista
Senior radio operator

4. Radiotelefonista
Radio operator
5. Starszy ratownik
Senior medic
6. Ratownik
Medic
7. Celowniczy
Gunner, section machine gun
8. Strzelec
Assistant gunner, section machine gun
9. Starszy strzelec wyborowy
Senior sniper
10. Strzelec wyborowy
Sniper
11. Starszy saper
Senior engineer
12. Saper
Engineer

This basic tactical organisation provides a strong element of specialisation, which suggests that each individual in the section can develop a depth of skills within the more limited training time available to territorial soldiers compared to full-time professional soldiers.¹⁷

¹¹ Testimony by Acting Commander WOT, Brigadier General Krzysztof Stańczyk, X Kadencja, Sejm Rzeczypospolita Polska, Pełny zapis przebiegu posiedzenia, Komisji Obrony Narodowej (nr 11) z dnia 24 kwietnia 2024 r.

¹² Col. Wójczech Prygiel and Lt. Col. Krzysztof Bednarz, 'Nowy rodzaj sił zbrojnych', *Przegląd Sił Zbrojnych*, No. 5 (Wrzesień-Październik 2017), p. 78.

¹³⁻¹⁴ Testimony by Acting Commander WOT, Brigadier General Krzysztof Stańczyk, X Kadencja, Sejm Rzeczypospolita Polska - 24 kwietnia 2024 r.

¹⁵ Jędrzej Graf, *Drony, haubice i pojazdy dla WOT. Gen. Stańczyk: sporo doprawy w systemie szkolenia [WYWIAD]*, *Defence 24*, 14 August 2024, defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/drony-haubice-i-pojazdy-dla-wot-gen-stanczyk-sporo-do-poprawy-w-systemie-szkolenia. Accessed: 14 August 2024.

¹⁶ 'Wspaniała Dwunastka', *Dowództwa Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej, wojsko-polskie.pl/dwot/wspaniala-12*. Accessed 25 November 2025.

As the ‘magnificent twelve’ organisation demonstrates, the WOT capabilities are configured for their light infantry role. The weapons mix includes assault rifles (Grot), sniper rifles (Bor and Sako TRG M10), a section

¹⁷ Elżbieta Obrębska, ‘Terytorialsi do zadań specjalnych’, *Polska Zbrojna*, 6 March 2024, polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/41303?t=Terytorialsi-do-zadan-specjalnych. Accessed: 26 November 2025.

¹⁸ Magdalena Kowalska-Sendek, ‘Light Equipment for Light Infantry’, *Polska Zbrojna*, 14 December 2021, polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/36021?t=Light-Equipment-for-Light-Infantry. Accessed 27 November 2025.

¹⁹ Jędrzej Graf, ‘Drony, haubice i pojazdy dla WOT. Gen. Stańczyk: sporo doprawy w systemie szkolenia’ [WYWIAD] and Adam Świerkowski, ‘Czy terytorialsi kupią artylerię w 2026 roku?’ [OPINIA], *Defence 24*, 5 January 2026, defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/czy-terytorialsi-kupia-artylerie-w-2026-roku-opinia. Accessed: 5 January 2026.

²⁰ ‘Plan budowy WOT’, *Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej*, gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/plan-budowy-wot. Accessed 27 November 2025.

²¹ ‘WOT po pierwszym roku: 7,6 tys. żołnierzy, wydane 1,1 mld złotych’, *Defence 24*, 9 January 2018, defence24.pl/724938,wot-po-pierwszym-roku-76-tys-zolnierzy-wydane-11-mld-zlotych-1. Accessed: 1 September 2018 and *Testimony by General Wiesław Kukuła, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, X kadencja, Zapis Stenograficzny z posiedzenia Komisji Obrony Narodowej (14.)*, 8 września 2021 r., Warszawa 2021 r.

²² Łukasz Zajac, ‘WOT podsumowuje rok: więcej żołnierzy i nowych zadań’, *Defence 24*, 30 December 2025, defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/wot-podsumowuje-rok-wiecej-zolnierzy-i-nowych-zadan. Accessed: 30 December 2025.

²³⁻²⁴ *Testimony by General Wiesław Kukuła, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, X kadencja, Zapis Stenograficzny z posiedzenia Komisji Obrony Narodowej (14.)*, 8 września 2021 r., Warszawa 2021 r.

²⁵ ‘Kobiety w wojsku’, *Biuro prasowe Dowództwa Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej*, 8 March 2025, media.terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/informacje/848511/kobiety-w-wojsku. Accessed: 3 March 2025 and ‘WOT rosną i nie rezygnują z artylerii’, *Defence 24*, 14 August 2024.

²⁶ ‘Szkolenie podstawowe -sprawdz, który wariant jest dla Ciebie – ‘Szesnastka’ vs szkolenie wyrównawcze’, *Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej*, terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/szkolenie-warianty. Accessed: 19 December 2025.

²⁷ ‘3 etapy szkolenia’, *Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej*, terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/3-etapy-szkolenia. Accessed: 19 December 2025.

machine gun (UKM 2000) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7). Support weapons include 61mm light mortars (LMP-2017) and anti-tank guided missiles (Javelin). Unmanned aerial vehicle capability includes WB Electronics FlyEye and Warmate.¹⁸ These capabilities are due to be upgraded or increased, not least because of the Ukraine conflict. Each brigade will seek improvement in air defence by acquiring the effective Polish produced man-portable air defence systems (Piorun). Increasing organic indirect firepower is also a major priority with the acquisition of either mortar or artillery capability. Likely contenders are either 120mm mortars or 105mm guns. At the section level, plans include acquisition of Carl-Gustav recoilless rifles to replace the Soviet era RPG-7 and first-person view drones adding UAS capability at the most basic level of the WOT force structure.¹⁹

STRENGTH, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Since its inception, the final strength of WOT has been set at 53,000, even with the increase in the number of planned brigades.²⁰ At the end of the first year of its existence, WOT strength reached 7,600 soldiers and since then it has recruited steadily toward its authorised ceiling. Only the COVID pandemic period delayed force growth by between 3,500 and 5,000 territorial soldiers.²¹ At the end of 2025, total WOT strength amounted to 44,900 soldiers. In a few years’ time it is likely to reach its statutory strength.²²

Recruitment for WOT can not only be measured as successful in progress toward reaching full strength but also in terms of the educational level of its recruits and its gender diversity. In his testimony before the Polish Parliament’s (Sejm) National Defence Committee in Autumn



“RECRUITMENT FOR WOJSKA OBRONY TERYTORIALNEJ CAN NOT ONLY BE MEASURED AS SUCCESSFUL IN PROGRESS TOWARD REACHING FULL STRENGTH BUT ALSO IN TERMS OF THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF ITS RECRUITS AND ITS GENDER DIVERSITY.”

2021, General Wiesław Kukuła, the then Commander of the WOT, highlighted the fact that 32 per cent of territorial soldiers had received higher education, with another 19 per cent continuing their studying in various levels of education. General Kukuła stressed the value that this educational attainment brought to WOT and the importance of utilising “all this potential”.²³ He also drew attention in his testimony to the “very high level of interest” among women to join up. In 2021, women constituted 19 per cent of the territorial soldiers in WOT. In the professional element of the armed forces, however, they only made up six per cent of serving soldiers.²⁴ More recent statistics in early 2025 on education levels and female representation in the WOT place 44 per cent of all territorial soldiers as having higher or secondary school education and women making up 20 per cent of WOT strength. In the professional cadre assigned to the WOT, the overall percentage of women was lower at 15 per cent but still compares favourably against female representation in the professional element of the Polish armed forces.²⁵

The training system for WOT is predicated on a three-year cycle

after which a territorial soldier will be certified as ‘combat ready’. Entry into the WOT begins with two options for initial training. The first is for individuals with no military experience. The training is intensive and candidates can either opt for 16 days of continuous basic training or weekend basic training of eight two-day sessions. The second option is ‘remedial training’ for those who already have military experience in the reserves. It also follows the model of 16 days continuous training or spread over eight weekends.²⁶ Following initial basic or remedial training, the first year of the three-year training regime consists of ‘individual training’ that lays a groundwork of basic skills and theoretical knowledge. This stage of training makes use of an extensive e-learning platform. Moreover, it serves as a selection process for the training stages that follow. The second year focuses on specific roles, such as medic and sapper, within the section. The final third year is devoted to collective training to build unit teamwork and cohesion.²⁷ The initial three-year training cycle allows for fitness improvement to bring territorial soldiers up to required standards. The ongoing training commitment for a territorial

soldier is a minimum of two days per month.²⁸

There are also pathways for territorial soldiers to become non-commissioned officers and officers. The SONDA course divides training time between WOT brigades and the WOT headquarters at Zegrze and leads to successful candidates being promoted to corporal. To qualify for the SONDA course a territorial soldier must have at least a secondary education, a good service record and a minimum of one year's WOT service.²⁹ The SONDA course began in 2019 and up to 2023 trained about 1,200 non-commissioned officers.³⁰ For officer training, the AGRYKOLA course lasts 13 months at either the Land Forces Academy or the Military University of Technology. To qualify, a successful candidate must have a minimum of one year's service, a university degree, English language proficiency (NATO STANAG 1111) and no criminal record. Successful completion of the course sees the candidate commissioned as a second lieutenant. The output of the AGRYKOLA course is about 80 junior officers per year.³¹

For more advanced training of WOT cadre, the Toruń based Training Centre for the Territorial Defence Forces (Centrum Szkolenia Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej (CSWOT)) provides specialist and tactical training courses for unit commanders. Areas such as leadership, medical competences, sniper training and weapon systems training for Javelin anti-tank missiles and the Polish produced Warmate loitering munition are the responsibility of the CSWOT. In addition to the centre's core courses, shorter more focused courses are conducted on such topics as operational environments. A recent example is the five-day urban warfare course held in November 2025



with participants drawn from WOT brigades across Poland.³²

MILITARY TRADITION

In terms of Polish military traditions, the WOT draws on the legacy of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa (AK)) of the Second World War and the postwar resistance organisations to communist rule. The Home Army was the largest and most sophisticated resistance organisation in Europe during the Second World War. The AK developed a diverse range of capabilities that included intelligence acquisition, propaganda, a special operations element and partisan units. The AK was very much embedded in Polish society and operated on a decentralised local basis. These qualities make the AK the obvious choice as a source of WOT military tradition. The inclusion by WOT of the Kotwica (anchor) that symbolised the phrase 'Fighting Poland' (Polska walcząca) on the shield of its cap badge and the naming of brigades after prominent leaders of the AK are a salute to this.

CONCLUSION

Since its inception in 2016, the WOT has contributed to strengthening the national resilience of Poland. It has done so in two important ways. First it has added mass and military capability to the Polish armed forces in the context of the WOT's defined wartime role primarily as a local defence force. The WOT has been a cost-effective addition to Polish defence with its design as a light infantry force. As the experience of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces (UTDF) has shown since the Russian invasion in 2022, such additional mass can prove pivotal. The UTDF contributed to the Ukrainian defence in a number of early actions at the onset of the war and subsequently added strength in wartime conditions, and offers a contemporary validation of the military utility of territorial defence forces.³³ Second, the WOT has reinvigorated the connection between Polish society and the Polish armed forces. The WOT's local presence across the country provides a strong connection

to communities and fosters national defence awareness in an increasingly unstable and dangerous European security environment. The fact that the WOT has been successful in recruiting sizable numbers of female Polish territorial soldiers is another measure of its connection with Polish society. Although the internal role of the WOT in promoting national resilience in pandemics and during natural disasters, offering aid to the civil power (border control) and providing security against sub-threshold threats has been beyond the scope of this *In-Depth Briefing*, it is nevertheless a subject worthy of future complementary consideration. Although the WOT cannot be said to be part of a 'comprehensive or total' defence system as found in Nordic countries, it provides an essential foundation for developing integrated national resilience.

²⁸ 'Służba – system szkolenia', *Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej*. gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/sluzba-system-szkolenia. Accessed: 19 December 2025.

²⁹ 'Zostań podoficerem lub oficerem WOT', *Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej, terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/kursy*. Accessed: 19 December 2025.

³⁰ 'Major Witold Sura, "SP SONDA: Podoficerowie solą Armii"', 23 January 2023. *media.terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/informacje/788442/sp-sonda-podoficerowie-sola-armii*. Accessed: 19 December 2025.

³¹ 'Zespół prasowy DWOT, "Wierny przysiędże wojskowej, świadom godności oficera Wojska Polskiego..."', 5 December 2024. *media.terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/informacje/844828/wierny-przysiedze-wojskowej-swiadom-godnosci-oficera-wojska-polskiego*. Accessed: 19 December 2025.

³² 'Miejskie pole bitwy – kurs walki w mieście w CSWOT', *Centrum Szkolenia Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej*, 17 November 2025. *cswoi.wp.mil.pl/aktualnosci/miejskie-pole-bitwy-kurs-walki-w-miescie-w-cswot*. Accessed: 19 December 2025.

³³ 'Mykola Bielieskov, "Ukraine's Territorial Defence Forces: The War So Far and Future Prospects"', *RUSI*, 11 May 2023. *rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraines-territorial-defence-forces-war-so-far-and-future-prospects*. Accessed 7 January 2026.